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DRUG SAFETY: IT'S A LEARNING PROCESS
VANESSA ENG*
INTRODUCTION
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved every drug
currently on the market after successfully completing a complex multi-
stage review and approval process.' Beginning an investigational new drug
application (IND), a drug must complete three phases of clinical trials. 2
Phase I studies assess how the human body metabolizes low doses of the
drug and the resulting side effects. 3 Phrase II measures the efficacy and
safety of the drug in a small number of patients who suffer from the
targeted illness or condition.4 In Phase III, drug sponsors must provide
FDA with substantial evidence confirming their successful Phase II results
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Economics 2006, SUNY
at Binghamton.
I See Scan M. Basquill, Comment, Prescription Drug Liability and Postmarketing Surveillance: A
Modest Proposal, 25 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 69, 74 (2006) (explaining the purpose of
maintaining a strict evaluation process and the necessity of a multi step review system); see also FDA,
About the Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov/cder/info/consumer_
approved.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter About the Food and Drug Administration]
(discussing the steps in the review process for the approval of a new drug).
2 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2008) (stating the requirements for an IND); see also Charles Steenburg,
The Food and Drug Administration's Use of Postmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception
to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 296 (2006) (discussing the three phase process to obtaining
approval for a drug after passing the preliminary safety tests).
3 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2008) (stating the phase one requirements for approval of an IND).
See generally Steenburg, supra note 2, at 296 (discussing the origin of the multi-stage review and
explaining the three requisite phases).
4 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2008) ("Phase 2 includes the controlled clinical studies conducted to
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or indications in patients with the
disease or condition under study. ... ); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 296 ("Phase II trials
evaluate both efficacy and safety in a small number of patients who actually suffer from the ailment that
the investigational drug targets.").
5 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2008) ("Phase 3 studies are expanded controlled and uncontrolled trials.
They are performed after preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness of the drug has been obtained.
..."); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 297 ("Phase III studies are significantly larger investigations
that seek to confirm the results of successful Phase II trials .... ").
6 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 296-97 (discussing the steps for approving the drug for marketing
after the three phases); see also About the Food and Drug Administration, supra note I (stating that
new drugs which successfully complete the approval process may be marketed with the consent of the
FDA).
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with a significantly larger patient-base. 5 After Phase III, the FDA may
make a determination allowing the drug to be marketed. 6
But what happens to the drug after approval? Despite the rigorous
testing and monitoring that occurs pre-approval, the most serious adverse
effects arise after the drug is made available to the general population.7
Therefore, postmarketing surveillance should be treated as an essential
follow-up to the approval process. 8 The FDA's current postmarketing
regulation consists of Phase IV study commitments, and an adverse events
reporting system (AERS).9 Postmarketing commitments are aimed at
ensuring a drug's safety after approval,' 0 while the purpose of AERS is to
detect patterns of actual or potential adverse events.ll However, this
postmarketing surveillance system is far from perfect.12 Regardless of its
status as the world's leading pharmaceutical regulatory agency,13 the FDA
7 See Stephen J. Schanz, Pharmaceutical Postmarket Review: Fact or Fiction?, 62 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 493, 493 (2007) (discussing the necessity for strong controls and monitoring of new drugs after
they have been cleared for marketing); see also David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, Health
Regulation and Governance: A Critical Examination of the FDA 's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to- Warn
Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 490 (2008) (remarking on the shortcomings of the post marketing monitoring
process of newly approved FDA drugs).
8 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 495 (contending that "postmarket surveillance is an important
adjunct to the approval process which cannot be ignored"); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 298
(considering former FDA Commissioner George Larrick's testimony that the "'early period following
general marketing of a drug may be regarded as a final step in the testing of a product"' (quoting Drug
Safety (Part One): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Government Operations, 88th
Cong. 152 (1964) (statement of George P. Larrick, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration))).
9 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 494 (highlighting the importance of the two components); see also
Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 7, at 489 (discussing the steps in the post approval monitoring process of
the drug).
10 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 494 ("The objective in carrying out and evaluating these trials is to
determine how safe and effective the drug is and whether it qualifies for market approval."); see also
Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 7, at 489 ("[T]he FDA [has] authority to require Phase IV studies for
drugs already approved if the FDA makes a determination that 'new safety information' shows an
unexpected risk that cannot be addressed through other controls.").
II See Roselie A. Bright, Strategy for Surveillance of Adverse Drug Events, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
605, 605 (2007) ("The main goal of drug surveillance is to obtain warnings of previously unidentified
adverse drug events (ADE) and to detect patterns of actual or potential ADE."); see also Lance L. Shea
et al., Cause and Effect? Assessing Postmarketing Safety Studies as Evidence of Causation in Products
Liability Cases, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 446-47 (2007) ("[A]dverse event reports are helpful in
directing further inquiry by detecting possible signals of unusual adverse events or unusual numbers of
common adverse events.").
12 See Katharine Neckers, Harmonization of Drug and Medical Device Development in the US and
Japan: Movement Towards International Cooperation in the Postgenomic Era, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 295, 302 (2006) (characterizing and listing a majority of the current shortcomings within the
current surveillance system); see also Bert Black & Keith Altman, Deciphering the Adverse Event
Reporting System, 41 TRIAL 36, 40 (2005) (acknowledging that the voluntary nature of the AERS and
unstandardized criteria that doctors use in determining whether an adverse reaction should be reported
can make the quality of AERS reports uneven).
13 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 299 (tagging the FDA as the "world's first regulator to decide
whether to send a given drug out into commerce"); see also Lars Noah, One Decade of Food and Drug
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may stand to learn from its two main competitors: the European Union
(EU) and Japan.14 Both the EU and Japan consider postmarket monitoring
of drugs as a top priority; each taking strong measures to ensure drug
safety.' 5 The EU's "pharmacovigilance" system threatens liability if certain
postmarketing regulations are not complied with.16 Japan targets the early
stages in postmarketing surveillance and requires early adverse reaction
reports, as well as early clinical investigations and studies.17 With the
FDA's problems of enforcing compliance from pharmaceutical companies'
underreporting of adverse events and overall monitoring,18 postmarketing
surveillance in the U.S. would greatly improve if the FDA emulated certain
aspects of the EU and Japanese postmarketing surveillance systems.
Part I of this note will provide background on the FDA's statutory
authority. It will outline the Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act of 1997,19 and the authority that the FDA derives from it. This section
will focus on the two key aspects of postmarket pharmaceutical regulation
- postmarketing study commitments and adverse event reporting, and their
Law Scholarship: A Selected Bibliography, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 641,641 (2000) (noting that the FDA
is a significant regulatory agency because it regulates products that account for 25 percent of consumer
expenditures).
14 See Justina A. Molzon, The International Conference on Harmonization Common Technical
Document - Global Submission Format?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 447, 447 (2005) (explaining that in
1990, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan formed the International Conference on
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH)
mainly because the majority of drugs and medicines were developed in these three regions); see also
Rosemarie Kanusky, Pharmaceutical Harmonization: Standardizing Regulations Among the United
States, the European Economic Community, and Japan, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 665, 676-88 (1994)
(detailing the new and extensive processes for regulation of pharmaceuticals and new drug approval in
the European and Japanese markets, which make such drugs marketable in the United States).
15 See discussion infra Parts ILA, 11.B.
16 See Duncan Matthews & Caroline Wilson, Pharmaceutical Regulation in the Single European
Market, 17 MED. & L. 401, 419 (1998) (defining "pharmacovigilance" as the regulatory agencies' on-
going monitoring of safety of pharmaceutical products once they are marketed); cf Stephen A.
Goldman, U.S. Postmarketing Pharmacovigilance Compliance in the Midst of Regulatory Uncertainty,
62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 513, 526 (2007) (suggesting that U.S. pharmaceutical companies would benefit
by incorporating the ICH's "pharmacovigilance planning," which went into effect in Europe in
November 2005).
17 See Neckers, supra note 12, at 308 (noting that the postmarketing surveillance system in Japan
"requires pharmaceutical companies to complete early adverse reaction reports, 'early phase
postmarketing vigilance,' clinical experience investigation, special investigations, and postmarketing
clinical studies"); see also Rachel F. Ochs, Pharmaceuticals: The Battle for Control in the 21st
Century, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 297, 331-32 (suggesting that the FDA's stringent regulation of
pharmaceutical drugs encourages the Japanese government to improve its clinical testing in order to
compete in the American market).
18 See Neckers, supra note 12, at 301-02 (noting that the author does not propose that
postmarketing in Japan and the EU is perfect; however, their systems' weaknesses are beyond the scope
of this note); see also Peter B. Edelman, Japanese Product Standards as Non- Tariff Trade Barriers:
When Regulatory Policy Becomes a Trade Issue, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389, 428-29 (1988) (revealing
that Japan's regulation of pharmaceuticals has a protectionist effect, causing its pharmaceutical market
to operate with a lack of transparency that foreign firms find cumbersome).
19 Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
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respective problems. Part II summarizes the regulatory systems in the
European Union and Japan, highlighting their unique features. Finally, Part
III will propose various changes that should be made to strengthen the
FDA's postmarketing surveillance system.
I. POSTMARKETING IN THE U.S.
A. Phase IV
1. Section 130 of the Modernization Act in Effect
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 requires
the FDA to report annually in the Federal Register on the status of
postmarketing commitments made by sponsors of drug and biological
products. 20 Section 506B was added to the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, and allowed the FDA to monitor the progress of
postmarketing study commitments, which are either voluntarily agreed to,
or required. 21 Under this additional authority, the FDA has promulgated its
own rules that provide a framework for the content and format of the
annual progress report. 22 Published on October 30, 2000, 21 C.F.R. §
314.81(b)(2) modifies annual report requirements for new drug applications
(NDAs) and abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs).23 Specifically,
under section 314.81(b)(2)(vii), applicants of approved drugs must submit
annual reports detailing the status of each clinical safety, clinical efficacy,
20 21 U.S.C. § 356b (2008); Report on the Performance of Drug and Biologics Firms in
Conducting Postmarketing Commitment Studies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5069 (Feb. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Report]
("According to the regulations, once a postmarketing study commitment has been made, an applicant
must report on the progress of the commitment on the anniversary of the product's approval until the
postmarketing study commitment is completed or terminated .... ).
21 21 U.S.C.S. § 356b(a)(1) (explaining that the report must be submitted in a form prescribed by
the Secretary in regulations issued by the Secretary); § 130, 111 Stat. at 2331 (noting that any
agreement between the Secretary and drug sponsor prior to Act's effective date shall be subject to the
requirements of the Act).
22 See Report, supra note 20, at 5069 (explaining that section 506B of the Act provides the FDA
with authority to monitor the progress of postmarketing studies); 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii) (2008)
(stating that status reports for pediatric studies shall include statements indicating whether
postmarketing clinical studies in pediatric populations were required by FDA under § 201.23).
23 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2) (explaining that applicants shall submit two copies of the report to the
FDA division responsible for reviewing the application annually within sixty days of the anniversary
date of U.S. approval of the application); see FDA, NEW DRUG APPLICATION (NDA) PROCESS,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/NDA.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2008) (defining new
drug applications as the vehicle through which drug sponsors formally propose that the FDA approves
new pharmaceuticals for sale and marketing in the U.S); see also FDA, Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) Process for Generic Drugs, http://www.fda.gov/cder/
regulatory/applications/ANDA.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2008) (identifying ANDA as documents that
provide for review and ultimate approval of generic drug products).
DRUG SAFETY
clinical pharmacology, and nonclinical toxicology study that is required by
the FDA or that they have committed to conduct.24
Once an applicant commits to conducting a postmarketing study, they
are required to report annually on the status of the commitment until the
study is completed or terminated. 25 The FDA may determine that the study
has been completed or that it is either no longer feasible or would no longer
provide useful information.26 The progress report must include a
description of the postmarketing study commitment, a schedule for
completing the study commitment, and a characterization of the current
status of the commitment. 27 A brief explanation of the study's progress is
also included.28 A commitment schedule should include projected dates
for: (1) submission of the study protocol to FDA, (2) a finalized list of
patients, (3) completion of the study, and (4) submission of the final study
report to FDA.29 The current status of the commitment must be defined as
follows:30 "pending" means the study has not been initiated, but does not
meet the criterion for delayed;31 "ongoing" indicates the study is
proceeding according to or ahead of the original schedule; 32 "delayed"
signifies that the study is behind the original schedule; 33 "terminated"
means the study was ended before completion, but a final study report has
not been submitted to FDA; and "submitted" indicates that the study has
24 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii) (discussing that status reports for pediatric studies must include
statements indicating whether postmarketing clinical studies in pediatric populations were required by
the FDA under § 201.23); see Report, supra note 20, at 5069 (explaining that postmarketing
commitments concerning chemistry, manufacturing, production, controls, and studies conducted on an
applicant's own initiative are not required to be reported under §§ 314.81(b)(2)(vii) and 601.70).
25 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii) (noting that the FDA will notify a drug sponsor in writing
when study commitment requirements are fulfilled or no longer feasible); see also Report, supra note
20, at 5069 (stating that applicants must report on progress of reports on anniversary of product's
approval).
26 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii) (noting that status of postmarketing studies must be reported
annually until provided further determination by the FDA); See Report, supra note 20, at 5069
(explaining that annual progress reports may be ceased when commitments are no longer required).
27 See Report, supra note 20, at 5069 (listing three factors central to describing the nature of the
study commitment); see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REPORTS ON STATUS OF
POSTMARKETING STUDY COMMITMENTS - IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 130 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997 8 (2006) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY], available at
http://www.fda.gov/Cber/gdlns/
postl30.pdf (highlighting that in most cases the FDA and drug sponsors will have concurred on a
protocol before filing the first annual postmarketing study commitment status report).
28 See Report, supra note 20, at 5069 (explaining that annual report's progress must be detailed in a
formal schedule).
29 Id. (explaining that four specific dates must be included in the report schedule).
30 Id. (listing five definitions that must be provided in an annual report).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
2009)
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been completed or terminated,34 and a final study report has been submitted
to FDA.35
The FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) is
responsible for maintaining the databases of the postmarketing
commitment studies reports.3 6 The progress reports contain information on
factors such as: the number of applicants with open (uncompleted)
postmarketing commitments, the number of open postmarketing
commitments, and the number of open postmarketing commitments for
which the FDA did not receive an annual report, etc. 37 As required under
21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii), these reports are available to the public
through publication in the Federal Register and on the FDA website. 38 The
Secretary of Health and Human Services must determine whether a
commitment has been satisfactorily completed and, if not completed by the
proposed deadlines, why it was not completed.3 9 If a study is found to have
been unsatisfactorily completed, a sponsor may be required to notify
practitioners of the failure to complete the studies, including any
unanswered questions of safety.40
Postmarketing studies can be either required or voluntarily agreed to by
sponsors. 41 Agreements by sponsors to voluntarily undertake a
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See generally FDA, About the CDER, http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/default.htm (last visited
Aug. 1, 2008) (describing the organization and functions of the CDER); FDA, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
REPORTS ON POSTMARKETING STUDIES (FDAMA 130) 7 (2002) [hereinafler FDAMA 130], available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/fdama/pstmrktfdamal30.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2008) (noting the CDER's
procedures for maintaining databases of postmarketing commitments, as well as its development of
more efficient systems).
37 See Report, supra note 20, at 5069 (listing five details included in every annual report sent to the
FDA); FDAMA 130, supra note 36, at 8-9 (explaining the specific details that must be reported to the
Federal Register); see generally FDA, U.S. FDA CDER Home Page, http://www.fda.gov/cder/
(providing information on the CDER's history, accomplishments and other general background).
38 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii) (2008) ("The status of these postmarketing studies shall be
reported annually .... [The] FDA may publicly disclose any information described in... this section.
..."); see also Report, supra note 20, at 5069 (indicating that disclosed information is also available on
the CDER website).
39 See 21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(2) (2008) (providing the requirements a fast track product must meet to
receive approval); see also Schanz, supra note 7, at 494 (explaining that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services is the U.S.'s principle agency in protecting the health of Americans). See generally
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Home Page, http://www.hhs.gov/
about/whatwedo.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) (defining the Secretary's obligations to several public
health government agencies).
40 See 21 U.S.C. § 356b(e) (2008) ("[T]he Secretary may require that a sponsor who, for reasons
not satisfactory to the Secretary, fails to complete by its deadline a study under any of such sections of
such type for a drug or biological product ... notify practitioners who prescribe such drug or biological
product of the failure to complete such study .... ); see also Schanz, supra note 7, at 494 (explaining
the duties a sponsor may owe to practitioners if their study is found unsatisfactory).
41 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 494. Study commitments are FDA tools to ensure drug safety. Id.
Together, study commitments and the AE system are a critical stage of the drug approval and
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postmarketing study occur either at the time of drug approval, or after
approval.42 Commitments that are made at the time of drug approval are
generally intended to provide additional information about the risks,
benefits, and optimal use of the drug.43 Those that are made after drug
approval are tailored towards a specific safety concern that has been
discovered after approval.44
The FDA may require sponsors to conduct postmarketing study
commitments only in specific situations. 45 First, when verification of
clinical benefits of drugs that were approved under the accelerated approval
process is needed, the FDA has the authority to mandate these
postmarketing studies. 46 Second, if a drug has been approved based only on
animal efficacy data, a sponsor must conduct postmarketing studies when
ethical and feasible to verify its clinical benefits and safety in humans.47 In
monitoring processes. Id. The type of regulatory framework determines the effectiveness and safety of a
drug. Id. "[S]uch [postmarketing] studies are generally not required for most drugs and devices" even
though postmarketing studies capture "a critical information production point, because many of the
most important safety and efficacy problems only become clear after a drug has entered the patient
population." See Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency
Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 633 (2007).
42 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 494 ("[S]ome postmarketing studies can be voluntarily undertaken
by sponsors. The agreement to do so can arise at the time the drug is approved or after the FDA grants
marketing approval." (citing GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 27, at 3-4 )); see also OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FDA'S MONITORING OF POSTMARKETING
STUDY COMMITMENTS 3 (2006) [hereinafter HHS OIG], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-
01-04-00390.pdf (classifying these types of studies as those "requested by FDA and agreed to by drug
applicants").
43 See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 27, at 4 (stating that most post-approval studies focus
on information that is not available upon initial approval); Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions:
Harnessing Experiential Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 449, 457-58 (2000)
(highlighting that the pre-approval system provides information about a drug's efficacy, safety, and side
effects).
44 See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 27, at 4 (explaining that most post-approval studies
identify problematic results associated with previously approved drugs); Noah, supra note 43, at 459-
60 (recognizing that post-approval monitoring identifies issues that do not appear during pre-approval
studies including: proper dosage, interaction with other drugs, proper use for pediatric and geriatric
populations, smoking and alcohol lifestyle habits, and interaction with multiple diseases).
45 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 494 (listing some of the particular circumstances under which drug
sponsors may be required to conduct postmarketing studies); HHS OIG, supra note 42, at I (stating that
the FDA considers postmarketing studies essential in limited circumstances such as accelerated
approval applications or mandatory tests for pediatric studies).
46 21 U.S.C.S. § 356b(a)(l) (2008) ("[S]ponsors of a drug that has entered into an agreement.., to
conduct a postmarketing study of a drug shall submit... [this report] within 1 year after the approval of
such drug ...."); see 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2008) (specifying that the FDA's marketing accelerated
approval for new drugs may be subject to further drug studies); see also FDA, FDA's Drug Review
Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective (2002), http://www.fda.gov/fdac/
features/2002/402_drug.html (defining accelerated approval as the process that allows an NDA to be
approved before conducting normally required measures of effectiveness).
47 See 21 C.F.R § 314.610(b)(1) (2008) (clarifying that approval based on evidence of
effectiveness from studies on animals must be augmented by "[tihe applicant ... conduct[ing]
postmarketing studies, such as field studies, to verify and describe the drug's clinical benefit and to
assess its safety when used as indicated when such studies are feasible and ethical"); see also
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addition, certain drugs are approved for adults before pediatric studies can
be completed.48 Therefore, some postmarketing studies are necessary to
test the safety and efficacy of the drugs in pediatric populations. 49 Finally,
postmarketing commitments may be mandated when determining whether
a previous approval should be revoked. 50 Another form of postmarketing
studies is controls study commitments (CMCs), which are studies that
examine the consistency and reliability of a drug's strength, purity, and
potency. 5 1 However, these commitments are not subject to the annual
reporting requirement under section 314.81(b)(2)(vii). 52
The most recent report in the Federal Register, issued on February 2,
2007, summarizes the status of postmarketing commitments as of
September 30, 2006.53 Out of a total of 1,259 postmarketing commitments
of NDAs and ANDAs, only 144 were completed. 54 899 studies (71 percent)
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 27, at 3 ("For a drug or biological product approved on the basis
of animal efficacy data because human efficacy studies are not ethical or feasible,- an applicant must
conduct studies when ethical and feasible to verify and describe clinical benefit and to assess the
product's safety."); Schanz, supra note 7, at 494 (discussing the required postmarketing studies for
drugs whose FDA approval depends on animal based data).
48 See Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, § 2, 117 Stat. 1936, 1937
(2003) [hereinafter Pediatric Research Equity Act] (authorizing the FDA to require pediatric studies of
marketed drugs); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355b(b)(l) (2008) (requiring full investigative reports for drugs
that are exclusively pediatric that indicate whether the approved drug is safe and effective).
49 21 U.S.C.S. § 355b(b) (mandating exploratory records to determine an approved pediatric drug's
efficacy and suitability); see Pediatric Research Equity Act, supra note 48, §§ 2(b)(1)(i)-2(b)(l)(iii)
(explaining that marketed drugs and biological products for pediatric populations are subject to post-
approval determination of ultimate safety and effectiveness); see also Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing
Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Signals, Preemption, and the Drug Reform
Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 347, 368-69 (indicating that the FDA should have increased power to
enforce commitments for a post-approval test or surveillance because "failure to complete the
[postmarketing] study significantly affects ... the assessment of the safety of the drug").
50 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(1) (establishing that State access to specific clinical records and reports
may be necessary for approved drugs); see also GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 27, at 3
(explaining that under 21 C.F.R. § 355(k)(1), "[t]he FDA may also issue an order or regulation
requiring an applicant to provide a study report that is necessary and relevant to a determination
concerning whether there is or may be grounds for revoking approval of an approved drug"); see also
Schanz, supra note 7, at 494 (highlighting the statutory standard that requires postmarketing studies to
determine whether a drug's approval may be revoked).
51 See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 27, at 4 ("[P]ostmarketing CMC studies are
conducted because applicants agree, in writing, to conduct such studies to ensure the consistency and
reliability of product quality (e.g., strength, purity, and potency)."); see also BIo, THE DIFFERENCE
WITH BIOLOGICS: THE SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF ANY FOLLOW-ON
BIOLOGICS SCHEME 25 (2007), http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/WhitePaper.pdf (noting that
CMC studies are extremely important to ensuring that a biological product is safe and reliable).
52 Compare 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii) (2008) ("The status of... postmarketing studies shall be
reported annually until FDA notifies the applicant, in writing, that the agency concurs with the
applicant's determination that the study commitment has been fulfilled or that the study is either no
longer feasible or would no longer provide useful information."), with 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(viii)
(requiring drug sponsors to annually advise the FDA on the status of CMCs).
53 Report, supra note 20, at 5070 (providing a chart that details postmarketing study
commitments).
54 Id.
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were pending, 184 (15 percent) were ongoing, 31 (3 percent) were delayed,
and 1 (less than 1 percent) study had been terminated. 55 From these
statistics alone, it is evident that these postmarketing study commitments
are not being effectively enforced. 56
2. Problems with Phase IV Postmarketing Commitments
In theory, voluntary commitments by sponsors are an efficient means of
collecting postmarketing data.57 However, these agreements do not result
from "fairly standard negotiating," thus contributing to the frighteningly
low completion rate. 58 The complex relationship between the FDA and
pharmaceutical companies involves political and power struggles, with
each side sometimes giving and other times taking.59 Under the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 1992,60 the FDA was
authorized to collect fees from companies that produced certain drug and
biological products. 61 The PDUFA required that drug manufacturers pay
fees to the FDA for the processing of drug applications. 62 Yet, the PDUFA
55 Id.
56 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 495 ("Examining the total umbrella of existing rules, regulations
and statutes applicable to drug approval, it must be recognized that the law is not functioning
optimally."); see also HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 11-12 (illustrating that during fiscal year 2004, 53
percent of postmarketing study commitments were returned incomplete or with errors).
57 See Justin Blum & Jeffrey Tannenbaum, Drugmakers Fail to do Post-Approval Studies in U.S.,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid =
a8BjDILnn2kA (stating that as many as seventy-five percent of safety studies that drugmakers
committed to conduct have not begun); see also Phil B. Fontanarosa, Drummond Rennie, & Catherine
D. DeAngelis, Postmarketing Surveillance - Lack of Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 292 JAMA 21, (2004)
available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/292/21/2647 (suggesting that the lack of
completed voluntary study commitments threatens the current system's ability to ensure drug safety).
58 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 333 ("Closer examination raises concerns that many such
'voluntary agreements' are nothing of the sort."); Public Citizen, FDA Medical Officers Report Falling
Standards Permit Dangerous Drug Approvals, Dec. 2, 1998, http://www.citizen.org/
pressroom/release.cfm?ID--403 (reporting that within the past few years, safety and efficacy standards
for approving new drugs have decreased, allowing many drugs that should not have been approved to
receive approval).
59 See W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would it Have Ended Differently in the European
Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 378 (2006) (criticizing the U.S.' regulatory process as being too
easily influenced by political and economic pressures); see also Chris Joyner, Source of Rising Drug
Costs Disputed, CHATrANOOGA TtMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 9, 2003, at A8 (suggesting that part of the
rising cost of drugs stems from the increasing amounts that pharmaceutical companies are spending on
marketing directly to consumers, while spending less on research).
60 Pub. L. No. 102-571, § 736(a)(2), 106 Stat. 4491,4494-95 (2008) [hereinafter "PDUFA"].
61 See id. (noting the companies that produce drugs that are not subject to an exception must pay an
annual fee to the FDA Secretary); see also 21 U.S.C. § 379h (2008) (granting the FDA authority to
assess and use the enumerated drug fees); Thomas, supra note 59, at 372 (using the required fee paid to
the FDA to process applications for a drug's approval is an example of the FDA's authorization to
collect fees). See generally CBER, Prescription Drug User Fee Act, http://www.fda.gov/cber/pdufa.htm
(providing extensive information on the PDUFA).
62 21 U.S.C. § 379h(a)(l)(A) (2008) (stating that every drug applicant must submit a fee to the
FDA with the application).
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also required the FDA to use the fees to hire employees to review
applications faster, creating a problematic system of FDA regulators that
were financially dependent upon the same firms they were regulating. 63
Moreover, some FDA employees that are responsible for approving
drugs have ties to the pharmaceutical companies themselves. 64 For
example, during the highly controversial Vioxx scandal, it was found that
ten of the thirty-two FDA advisors whose votes were determinative in
allowing Vioxx to return to the market had ties to the drug industry. 65
Testimony showed that the FDA ignored warnings of increased risk of
heart attacks and failed to change the warning label as a result of pressure
from drug manufacturers. 66 A more recent case concerns the morning-after
contraceptive pill, which was rejected even before the scientific
investigation was completed. 67 High level FDA management made the
premature decision to deny approval of the drug, causing Assistant FDA
Commissioner Dr. Susan F. Wood, Director of the Office of Women's
Health, to resign, due to the influence of political appointees.68 In this way,
63 See Thomas, supra note 59, at 372 ("[H]aving the regulators depend financially on the regulated
has laid the groundwork for concerns of a system compromised by conflict of interest."); James L.
Zelenay, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration Always a
Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 261, 262 (suggesting that the FDA's
dependence on fees from the drug industry creates a glaring conflict of interest).
64 Thomas, supra note 59, at 377 (noting the ties to the pharmaceutical industry held by FDA
advisors involved in approving Vioxx); see Peter Lurie, Cristina M. Almeida, Nicholas Stine, et al.,
Financial Conflict of Interest Disclosure and Voting Patterns at Food and Drug Administration Drug
Advisory Committee Meetings, 295 JAMA 1921, 1921 (2006) (reporting that a study of 221 drug-
related meetings held by sixteen advisory committees revealed that in seventy-three percent of the
meetings, at least one member or voting consultant disclosed a conflict).
65 See Thomas, supra note 59, at 377 (stating that "ten of the thirty-two FDA advisors on the Vioxx
matter had links to the [drug] industry"); see also Carla Sharetto, FDA 'Too Cozy with Drug
Companies, 'Senator Charges, DAILY NEWS CENT., Mar. 12, 2005, http://health.dailynewscentral.com
/content/view/501/62 (reporting charges from Senator Charles Grassley that "'[t]he existing Office of
New Drugs is hampered by real and perceived conflicts of interest').
66 See Thomas, supra note 59, at 372-73 (detailing the FDA's refusal to change the warning label
on Vioxx packages); Jonathan V. O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx(R) and the
Argument Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting From Defective Drugs, 48
ARiz. L. REv. 67, 88 (2006) ("Notwithstanding concerns among FDA officials that Vioxx posed
significant heart-related risks, the agency sat idly by while Merck spent more than $100 million
annually in direct-to-consumer marketing of Vioxx.").
67 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 59, at 377 (commenting that the FDA rejected a morning-after
contraceptive pill before finishing its investigation of the drug); see also Julie Rovner, GAO Questions
FDA Decision on 'Morning-After' Pill, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Nov. 15, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5013111 (describing the General Accountability
Office's investigation into the FDA's decision to reject the morning-after contraceptive, Plan B).
68 See Thomas, supra note 59, at 377 (emphasizing the political override of FDA's advisory panel
that had voted twenty-three to four authorizing the sale of the drug); Marc Kaufman, FDA Official Quits
Over Delay on Plan B: Womem's Health Chief Says Commissioner's Decision on Contraceptive was
Political, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2005, at A8 ("Susan F. Wood, assistant FDA commissioner for
women's health and director of the Office of Women's Health, said she was leaving her position after
five years because Commissioner Lester M. Crawford's announcement Friday amounted to
unwarranted interference in agency decision-making.").
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postmarketing studies may be viewed as a combination of FDA personnel
bending from external pressures, and higher-level officials wanting to
satisfy political agendas. 69
Another piece of the complicated regulator/regulated relationship is that
the FDA effectively has complete discretion in deciding whether to
approve a drug.70 Although sponsors have a statutory right to appeal FDA
decisions rejecting NDAs, courts are unwilling to question the FDA's
judgment. 71 Judges are understandably reluctant to approve a drug that
FDA experts found to be unsafe. 72 Furthermore, no effective means exists
to prevent the FDA from "sitting" on an application indefinitely.73 Despite
the requirement that the FDA take action 180 days after the filing of the
application, the FDA has never been forced to do so. 74 The agency may
also act on an NDA by issuing approval letters, but not actually approving
the NDA.75 For sponsors, the longer the delay in the review process, the
more financial losses they will inevitably sustain.76 Millions of dollars are
69 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 340 (noting that postmarketing studies have become a
compromise between external pressures and personal doubts regarding a drug's adequacy); see also
Christopher Placitella & Justin Klein, The Civil Justice System Bridges the Great Divide in Consumer
Protection, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 219, 220-21 (2005) (stating that the FDA appears to be falling under the
influence of the industries they are supposed to be regulating and political pressures of the
Administration in power).
70 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 335 (discussing the FDA's unreviewable discretion to deny
approval and ability to prolong the drug review process as evidence that the FDA has virtually complete
power); see also Linda Katherine Leibfarth, Note, Giving the Terminally Ill Their Due (Process): A
Case for Expanded Access to Experimental Drugs Through the Political Process, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1281, 1286-87 (2008) (detailing how the costs, length of time for approval and access to drug testing
has effectively given the FDA complete discretion in the drug approval process).
71 See 21 U.S.C.S. § 355(h) (2008) (granting drug sponsors the right to appeal FDA judgments on
NDAs and explaining the procedural steps of an appeal); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 334
(explaining that although sponsors have the right to appeal, "the agency in practice enjoys complete
discretion in deciding whether or not to allow manufacturers to bring their drugs on the market").
72 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 335 (stating that judges defer to the FDA experts on questions of
drug safety and approval); see also Leibfarth, supra note 70 at 1316 (noting that the Supreme Court,
recognizing its limitations in the fields of science and medicine, traditionally defers to FDA decisions).
73 Steenburg, supra note 2, at 334-35 ("The 1962 ... FDCA amendments nominally require that
FDA take action within 180 days after the ...filing of an application, but there is no specific
enforcement mechanism."); see Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of
Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 908-09 (1996) (commenting that the FDA can, effectively, delay review
indefinitely by claiming to be unsatisfied with the amount of detail of information provided by the
manufacturer).
74 See 21 U.S.C.S. § 355(c)(1) (requiring the FDA to take action within 180 days of the
application's filing); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 335 (explaining that there is no specific
enforcement mechanism for the 180-day requirement).
75 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 335 (stating that approval letters indicate that a drug is
effectively approved pending the resolution of certain issues); see also Liora Sukhatme, Note, Deterring
Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug Approval Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1220
(2007) (explaining that the FDA may issue approval letters conditioned on adherence to labeling details
and postmarketing requirements).
76 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 335 ("With each month that passes without marketing approval,
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lost each month a drug remains unapproved. 77  Consequently,
pharmaceutical companies may "agree" to postmarketing commitments in
order to speed up the approval process. 78 The FDA's power to withhold
approval is often characterized as the agency's "most powerful weapon." 79
On the other hand, drug sponsors also have a significant pull over FDA
in the area of voluntary commitments. 80 Sponsors can use media publicity
to their advantage by heavily promoting the drug before it is actually
approved.81 If a manufacturer of a promising new drug garners enough
support and publicity from the media and the community, "an FDA
rejection or delay runs the risk of drawing the ire of legislators and patient
advocacy groups." 82 For example, the sponsor of the breast cancer drug
Arimidex was able to generate enough support from the breast cancer
community that it actually informed the FDA that it would not agree to any
commitments unless the drug was approved immediately; the FDA obliged
in order to avoid any media backlash.8 3 Also, if the sponsor fails to
complete the commitments by the purported deadlines, the FDA may
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms conceivably lose millions of dollars worth of revenue."); see
also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 73, at 1220 ("Regulatory delay also means that drug manufacturers are
not likely to see any immediate returns on their substantial investments in the research development,
and.., approval process.").
77 See, e.g., Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2000) (estimating that a
drug company could earn approximately $3 million in revenue between January 10, 2000 and when the
FDA planned to grant final approval of its drug on February 9, 2000); Steenburg, supra note 2, at 335
(describing how drug sponsors lost revenue while waiting for their drugs to be approved).
78 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 336 (explaining that approvable letters offer the FDA a way to
exploit leverage, allowing them to pressure sponsors to commit to Phase IV studies in return for getting
a straight approval); see also Lars Noah, U.S. Food and Drug Regulation in Its First Century and
Beyond: The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory
Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 913-14 (2008) (noting that many drug companies could not
afford to decline accelerated procedures even if it meant submitting to postmarketing restrictions).
79 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 336 (quoting a FDA medical officer who characterized
"withholding approval as the agency's 'most powerful weapon"'); see also George W. Evans & Arnold
I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration's Regulation of Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech:
A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 389 (2003) (arguing that the FDA's power to
withhold product approval is one of the enforcement weapons in the FDA's extensive arsenal).
80 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 337 (highlighting that drug sponsors are hardly powerless in
negotiations with the FDA because such negotiations often occur after the drug is already on the
market, a time when the FDA has less leverage); see also Schanz, supra note 7, at 494-95 (noting that
postmarket negotiations may occur after approval and highlighting that the drug companies and the
FDA often have vastly different goals for such projects).
81 See Steenburg, supra note 2 at 338 (claiming that drug sponsors gain a better bargaining position
from media attention for their drugs prior to FDA approval); see also Barbara A. Brenner, The FDA:
Promoting Progress or Building Bureaucracy?, BREAST CANCER ACTION, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 12,
http://bcaction.org/uploads/PDF/76.pdf (discussing the FDA's rapid approval of the breast cancer drug
Arimidex before it could be fully tested and all side effects known).
82 Steenburg, supra note 2, at 338.
83 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 338 (mentioning the "major advance publicity" received by some
drugs, including Arimidex); see also Brenner, supra note 81, at 12 (discussing the great attention
devoted by the media to the breast cancer drug Arimidex and its rapid FDA approval).
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threaten to withdraw approval of the drug.84 However, the threat of
withdrawal is almost meaningless. 85 Drug sponsors are able to "passively"
resist completing their studies once they are in place - especially if the drug
is already on the market. 86
According to the Institute of Medicine, many of these studies occur as
afterthoughts, late in the review process. 87 Because these agreements occur
at the time of drug approval or after approval, the FDA has limited control
in negotiating the details of study protocols to ensure their efficacy. 88
Conversely, manufacturers also do not have time to assess whether the
FDA's demands are even reasonable, and are deprived of the opportunity to
weigh the costs and benefits of the proposed commitments. 89 Another
consequence of deferring these commitments is that many studies are
poorly designed, resulting in unnecessary and impracticable tests.90
84 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2008) (delineating the FDA Secretary's ability to withdraw approval of
a drug); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 337-38 (describing circumstances in which the FDA has
threatened to withdraw approval).
85 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 338 (characterizing the FDA's threat of withdrawal as
"toothless"); see also LARRY D. SASICH ET AL., THE DRUG INDUSTRY'S PERFORMANCE IN FINISHING
POSTMARKETING RESEARCH (PHASE IV) STUDIES (2000), available at
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6721 (discussing the rarity of actually withdrawing
a drug from market, despite a serious problem); U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG
SAFETY IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA'S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS
5 (2006) [hereinafter GAO], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf (reporting that
most cases of drug withdrawal from the market occur as a result of the sponsor's actions rather than
FDA's actions); Janis Kelly, IOM Study Slams FDA, Proposes Top-Down Restructuring and Much
More Funding, MUSCULOSKELETAL REP., Oct. 30, 2006, available at
http://www.mskreport.com/articles.cfm?articlelD=1016 (citing that the FDA cannot unilaterally compel
companies to fulfill their post marketing study commitments).
86 Steenburg, supra note 2, at 338 ("[S]ponsors can 'passively' resist Phase IV demands .... "); see
Gardiner Harris, Congressional Investigators Are Critical of F.D.A. 's Efforts to Detect Drug Dangers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2006, at A12 (discussing the Institute of Medicine's report which recommends
giving the FDA greater authority to force drug makers to complete post-approval clinical trials).
87 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 495-96. In 2007, the Institute of Medicine (OM) published "The
Future of Drug Safety," a report that examined FDA's regulatory oversight. Id. Due to recent drug
safety problems, many FDA actions have been called into question and IOM was asked by FDA to
investigate FDA's regulatory decision-making and oversight processes. Id. Also, Gardner Harris
commented that "[t]he report's conclusions are often damning. It describes the Food and Drug
Administration as rife with internal squabbles and hobbled by underfinancing, poor management and
outdated regulations." Gardiner Harris, Study Condemns F.D.A. 's Handling of Drug Safety, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2006, at Al.
88 Steenburg, supra note 2, at 337 (citing the FDA's limited ability to demand post approval study
requirements); see Harris, supra note 87, at Al (discussing the Institute of Medicine's report which
criticized the FDA's regulatory structure and recommended various changes to provide FDA with more
regulatory powers in order to better administer the drug approval process).
89 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 342 (noting that conferring with drug manufacturers at the last
minute denies them the opportunity to assess whether phase IV demands are reasonable); see also
Harris, supra note 87, at AI (discussing some of the IOM report's recommendations for overhauling the
FDA's regulatory system).
90 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 496 (finding that postmarketing studies implemented late in the
review process result in many unfulfilled commitments, ultimately hindering the usefulness of the
study); see also Report, supra note 20, at 5070 (reporting that twelve percent of total concluded studies
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Unnecessary commitment demands made by the FDA waste time and
financial resources. 91 Overall, these key factors contribute to the significant
number of delayed and incomplete postmarketing studies. 92
3. The FDA Lacked an Effective System of Monitoring Postmarketing
Commitments
In June 2006, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) published a
report, FDA's Monitoring of Postmarketing Study Commitments,
evaluating the extent to which the FDA monitors its open postmarketing
study commitments. 93 After extensive research and interviewing, the OIG
concluded that the FDA lacked an effective monitoring system for open
commitments. 94 CDER's Office of New Drugs (OND) employs reviewers
who are responsible for checking the accuracy of the annual status
reports.95 A database is used to help track and monitor the status of the
commitments. 96 In addition to ensuring accuracy, reviewers must also
make a determination of the commitment's progress, and how close it is to
completion.97 Reviewers must indicate whether or not they agree with the
of NDAs and ANDAs are categorized as "no longer needed or feasible").
91 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 341 (.'[U]nnecessary' commitment demands drive up research
and development (R&D) costs."); Gilhooley, supra note 49, at 368-69 (explaining that drug sponsors
with commitments to the FDA are frequently faced with high costs and fears of negative results).
92 See Schanz, supra note 7, at 496 (stating that communications between the FDA and drug
sponsors often occur far into the approval process, impeding the inception or completion of studies); see
also Thomas N. Tiedt, The Drug Safety System Conundrum, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 547, 554 (2007)
(noting that the latest report from the FDA to Congress revealed that two-thirds of postmarketing study
commitments were yet to be commenced and just twenty-one percent were ongoing).
93 See HHS 01G, supra note 42, at i-ii (describing the DIG's review of FDA's database of
postmarketing study commitments from 1990 to 2004 through examination of documents regarding
postmarketing study commitments, interviews of CDER project managers, and reviews of FDA policies
and procedures regarding postmarketing commitments); Donna Young, FDA's Monitoring of
Postmarketing Studies Probed, AM. Soc'Y HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS, Aug. 15, 2006,
http://www.ashp.org/import/news/HealthSystemPharmacyNews/newsarticle.aspx?id=2273 (stating that
the HHS 01G issued a report discussing the FDA's monitoring of postmarketing study commitments).
94 See HHS 0IG, supra note 42, at 14-16 (detailing problems of FDA postmarketing monitoring
system, including difficulty identifying overdue ASRs, a confusing numbering system, and an
inconsistently populated database); see also Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System:
Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICs 587, 662 (2005) ("[T]he FDA's postmarketing surveillance of drugs ... is less than optimally
rigorous. . . . The FDA lacks the resources to adequately analyze postmarketing data and lacks
sufficient ability to obtain further information from companies when needed.").
95 See HHS 01G, supra note 42, at 4-5 (describing reviewers in sixteen CDER review divisions as
trained in pharmacy, chemistry, and medicine); see also Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 7, at 485
(stating that over 1,000 OND reviewers work on a mere few dozen new drugs every year).
96 See HHS 01G, supra note 42, at 5 (noting that portions of the database are available on the
FDA's website); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 327 (using the FDA's postmarketing commitment
database to show the modest impact accelerated approval regulations have on Phase IV requirements).
97 See HHS D1G, supra note 42, at 4 ("The main focus of FDA reviews is to validate the accuracy
of the information in the ASRs; however, FDA also determines whether drug applicants are making
adequate progress towards fulfilling their commitments."); Jill D. Jacobson & David Feigal, Red Sky in
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proposed status of the commitments and the explanations for that status,
which are all offered by the sponsor.98 These reports should be reviewed
within ninety days of receipt.99
The first major challenge in the monitoring system is the fact that FDA
officials could not identify which commitments were actually overdue.100
Many reviewers had to search through a postmarketing commitment
database and some even relied on telephone calls from drug applicants
themselves to find overdue commitments. 101 The OIG also found their
database to be outdated, failing to account for many open commitments and
drugs that had been withdrawn.102 A second organizational flaw is the
confusing numbering system that is used to categorize commitments. 103
Numbers that should only be used to indicate a commitment's progress
levels are often used for other functions.a 04 As a result, many mislabeled
commitments are entered into the database, creating confusion for later
the Morning: Modifying Prescription Drug Labels as a Result of Postmarket Surveillance, 62 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 529, 532 (2007) (describing the duty of OND to review various sources of information and
make a determination as to what action, if any, is necessary).
98 See HHS 0IG, supra note 42, at 4 (explaining the requirement of reviewers to indicate whether
they concur or disagree on the status of commitments and proposed explanations of such status); see
also Jacobson & Feigal, supra note 97, at 532 ("[OND] is responsible for... postmarket monitoring of
drug safety, and is the primary decisionmaking authority when it comes to postmarket actions that may
be taken with respect to a drug.").
99 See HHS 0IG, supra note 42, at 4 (describing the FDA's planned review period); see also
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 27, at 14 (providing guidance for applicants to properly submit
postmarketing study commitment status reports for approved drugs).
100 See HHS GIG, supra note 42, at 14-15 (noting that reviewers at eight of the fourteen review
divisions classified their inability to identify open commitments as a major or moderate challenge in
their "ability to effectively monitor the progress" of the commitments); see also FDA, INDEPENDENT
EVALUATION OF FDA'S PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT III - EVALUATIONS & INITIATIVES:
POSTMARKETING COMMITMENTS STUDY FINAL REPORT 23 (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter INDEPENDENT
EVALUATION], available at http://www.fda.gov/ope/PMC/pmcstudy08.pdf (commenting on the
difficulty in determining which commitments are overdue).
101 See HHS GIG, supra note 42, at 14-15 (detailing the steps taken by reviewers to attain the
information sought); INDEPENDENT EVALUATION, supra note 100, at 23-24 (describing the
responsibilities of the reviewers in acquiring the status of postmarketing commitments).
102 See HHS GIG, supra note 42, at 11, 15 (noting that reviewers could not identify a
commitment's completion progress and approximately one-third of their annual status reports (ASRs)
were either missing or incomplete); see also INDEPENDENT EVALUATION, supra note 100, at 23
(presenting evidence of the inefficiency and outdated status of the postmarketing commitment
database).
103 See HHS GIG, supra note 42, at 15 (noting that the FDA database's numbering system for
categorizing commitments is confusing); see also FDA, Postmarketing Study Commitments,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/pmc/index.cfmStartRow-54&StepSize=1&Paging=Yes
(last visited Aug. 7, 2008) (showing evidence, via actual database examples, of the confusing
numbering system in the FDA postmarketing database).
104 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 15-16 (explaining why the numbering system for categorizing
commitments is confusing); see also Press Release, Rep. Edward J. Markey, U.S. Fed News, Rep.
Markey Urges FDA to Abide by HHS Inspector General Recommendations on Postmarketing Studies
For New Drugs, July 12, 2006 [hereinafter Markey Press Release] (urging the FDA to number
commitments uniquely and logically).
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:1
reviewers.105 A third problem is that the FDA database for postmarketing
commitments is outdated and lacks useful information. 106 The database
rarely includes any information on start dates, projected completion dates,
and already completed projects.107 Without this pertinent data, it is almost
impossible to track the status of the commitments, and to determine
whether drug applicants are completing their studies on time. 108
More importantly, the OIG found that the surveillance of these
commitments was not a high priority for FDA officials.109 When FDA
officials prioritize their workloads, they often do not have the resources and
time to fully and effectively monitor postmarketing study commitments.1 1 0
As a result of time pressures, reviewers even agreed with drug applicants
on terms that were missing from the ASR, thus compromising the accuracy
of the reports."I' In fiscal year 2004, the FDA only validated thirty percent
of the ASRs that were actually submitted."l 2 Of the ASRs that were
validated for accuracy, many of them were not completed within the ninety
day period, thus delaying the entire process for FDA and drug
105 See HHS 01G, supra note 42, at 16 (indicating the difficulty that results from mislabeling
commitments in the database).
106 See HHS 01G, supra note 42, at 16 (stating that the database does not consistently have the
updated pertinent information needed); see also INDEPENDENT EVALUATION, supra note 100, at 4
(discussing the outdated and inconsistent nature of the status tracking systems).
107 See HHS 01G, supra note 42, at 16 (giving examples of the incomplete nature of the
information compiled in the database); see also Markey Press Release, supra note 104 (advising the
FDA to include useful time-sensitive information on its database).
108 See HHS 01G, supra note 42, at 16 (noting that without adequate data, it is not possible to
readily determine the length of time it takes for applicants to complete their commitments, or whether
they are completed at all); see also Neckers, supra note 12, at 302 (stating that the lack of information
on reports leads to difficulties in determining causal relationships and adverse effects of drugs in
postmarket research).
109 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 17 (revealing that, according to FDA officials, "reviewing
drug applications and documenting FDA/industry meetings are higher priorities than reviewing
postmarketing study commitments and ASRs"); see also FDA, FY 2009 Congressional Justification,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2009/Execsum/l_Exec_Summary.pdf (last visited Aug. 7,
2008) (illustrating the FDA's budget which states that user fees will be increased in 2009 in order to
have more resources to review drug applications).
110 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 17 (reporting that the FDA "lack[ed] the resources to
accomplish all of the tasks assigned to them"); see also Basquill, supra note 1, at 84-85 (stating that
FDA is terribly under-staffed and under-funded).
III See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 18 (revealing that "FDA reviewers sometimes agreed with
drug applicants even when the applicants failed to provide one of the status options required by the
regulations"); see also Neckers, supra note 12, at 302 (stating that the FDA often receives incomplete
or inadequate reports).
112 HHS 01G, supra note 42, at 17 ("FDA validated only 30 percent (65) of the 217 ASRs that
were actually submitted by drug applicants in fiscal year 2004 .... ); see Pharmaceutical Processing,
FDA Should Fine Companies With Late Post-Marketing Studies, HHS OIG Says,
http://www.pharmpro.com/ShowPR-PUBCODE-02 I-ACCT--O000 I 00-ISSUE-0608-RELTYPE-PR
-PRODCODEO000--PRODLETT-O.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008) (noting that the FDA is currently
training its review division staff on report validation procedures and standardizing the process by which
post-marketing study commitments are requested and reviewed in reaction to its low validation
numbers).
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applicants. 113
Another important finding was that completed ASRs lacked useful
information."14 Drug applicants frequently failed to provide information
that was required or recommended by regulation.115 Much of the
information that was reported in the ASRs was of limited utility, providing
no assurance of the commitment's progress or whether it was en route to
completion.11 6 ASRs are a principal source of drug safety information for
the FDA and an important tool for monitoring postmarketing study
commitments. 1 7 If a substantial portion of an ASR is missing, and the
information that is present is inadequate, ASRs are essentially useless.118
Many reviewers even characterized the monitoring system as "very
shallow" because without useful data, drug applicants cannot be
encouraged to complete their studies. 119 The FDA must take steps to ensure
that these commitments are being fulfilled in order for these ASRs to be
beneficial. 120
113 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 17 (finding that the FDA often fell short of meeting its own
requirements for monitoring postmarketing study commitments); see also Basquill, supra note 1, at 84
(asserting that an increase of data that the FDA must review would require greater FDA resources than
those already available).
114 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 12 (noting that even complete ASRs often lacked information
that would be useful in monitoring the progress of postmarketing study commitments); see also
Neckers, supra note 12, at 301 (discussing the poor quality of submitted reports to the FDA).
115 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 13 (stating that many ASRs were missing important dates); see
also Neckers, supra note 12, at 302 (stating that the FDA often receives reports with inadequate
information or detail).
116 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 12-13 (stating that inadequate ASRs do not assist in ensuring
progress of postmarketing study commitments); see also Basquill, supra note 1, at 84-85 (stating that
the FDA is "woefully understaffed and under-funded").
117 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at II ("ASRs are intended to be a key source of information for
FDA and an important tool for monitoring postmarketing study commitments."); see also Curt D.
Furberg et al., The FDA and Drug Safety: A Proposalfor Sweeping Changes, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1938, 1939 ( 2006), available at http://www.ahrp.org/cms/content/view/358/28 (noting that the
FDA receives about 400,000 reports a year of serious or unexpected drug safety issues as part of its
Adverse Event Reporting System).
118 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 14 (explaining that ASRs do not give complete information
and as a result, reviewers are forced to search for past reports that were submitted by the sponsor); see
also Schanz, supra note 7, at 496-97 (asserting that about one-third of ASRs are not submitted or are
incomplete, and that many of the completed ones lack useful information).
119 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 13 (noting the claims made by an FDA official that the current
process for monitoring commitments is "'very shallow' because it does not necessarily move the
commitments towards completion); see also Schanz, supra note 7, at 495 ("Legally, the maze of
regulations governing postmarket obligations by pharmaceutical sponsors leaves considerable
opportunity for ambiguity, delays and lack of stringent enforcement measures to motivate
compliance.").
120 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 17 (indicating that monitoring postmarketing study comments
and ASRs is not a top priority at the FDA); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 361 (expanding on the
notion that because postmarketing demands are no longer a rare exception, completion rates of
commitments are expected to decrease).
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B. Serious Adverse Events Reporting
1. History
The Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology (OSE) identifies adverse
events through two important systems: postmarketing surveillance and risk
assessment. 121 Because premarket clinical trials are generally conducted on
populations of a few hundred to a few thousand participants,122 only a
fraction of a drug's practical, long-term effects are discovered.123 As a
result, the FDA approves drugs by judging whether the drug's known risks
are outweighed by its known benefits.124 The purpose of the FDA's
postmarketing surveillance system is to collect data on any rare or long
term effects of the drug that are not found during pre-approval.125 Under 21
C.F.R. § 314.80, all approved NDAs are required to report to the FDA
when an adverse drug reaction occurs.126 An adverse drug experience
121 See FDA, Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology,
http://www.fda.gov/Cder/Offices/ODS/default.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). CDER evaluates drug
safety by maintaining a system of postmarketing surveillance and risk assessment programs that
identify adverse events that were absent in the drug development process. Id. OSE was formerly known
as the Office of Drug Safety. Id. The CDER website gives a comprehensive view of the CDER's
function and how it achieves its goals. See U.S. FDA CDER Home Page, supra note 36. While risk
assessment is an integral aspect of postmarketing surveillance, it is outside the scope of this note.
122 See Syed Rizwanuddin Ahmad, Adverse Drug Event Monitoring at the Food and Drug
Administration: Your Report Can Make a Difference, 18(1) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 57, 57 (2003),
available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1494803 (noting further that
most trials exclude the elderly, pregnant women, patients with multiple diseases, and those on
medications suspected of interacting with the study drug); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 297
("Preapproval trials involve no more than a few thousand volunteers - often carefully culled and largely
homogenous - who are treated under carefully controlled conditions by highly-trained medical
specialists.").
123 See Abmad, supra note 122, at 57 (explaining that because the participants in clinical trials are
not always representative of the real world where the drug will be used, the safety reporting is not
always perfect); see also Basquill, supra note 1, at 76 (suggesting that adverse events that are too rare to
be noticed during the clinical trials may manifest themselves faster when a population hundreds of
times larger is exposed to the drug); Steenburg, supra note 2, at 297 (revealing that the FDA
commissioner admitted that even the most extensive clinical tests will only reveal a fraction of the
information that emerges during the course of a drug's use).
124 See GAO, supra note 85, at 7 (explaining that if the FDA has reason to believe that a drg on
the market poses a threat, it will weigh the effect of that adverse event against the benefit of the drug to
determine what actions to take); see also Basquill, supra note 1, at 74-75 (indicating that a prescription
drug will only be sold after it undergoes a "complex review and approval process" to determine whether
it meets agency standards of safety and efficacy).
125 CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, ENFORCEMENT OF THE
POSTMARKETING ADVERSE DRUG EXPERIENCE REPORTING REGULATIONS (1999), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/
aers/chapter53.htm (stating that all sponsors, manufacturers, packers and distributors are required to
report serious and unexpected adverse drug experiences to the FDA); see Ahmad, supra note 122, at 57
(noting that the FDA monitors the safety of each drug after it reaches the market through the Adverse
Event Reporting System, which receives information from the pharmaceutical companies, as well as
from physicians, nurses, dentists and consumers).
126 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c) (2008) ("The applicant shall report to FDA adverse drug experience
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(ADE) is any undesirable experience resulting from the use of a drug. 127 A
serious adverse drug experience (SADE) is any adverse event that is life-
threatening, or that results in hospitalization, a significant disability or
incapacity, a congenital anomaly, or death.128 Drug applicants must review
any and all ADE information that they obtain or receive from any
source. 129 Upon receipt of any adverse drug experience information,
applicants have fifteen days to submit an alert report for each event to the
FDA.130 A prompt investigation of each adverse drug experience must also
be conducted within fifteen calendar days of receipt of new information or
as requested by the FDA.131
OSE is responsible for reviewing these reports of adverse reactions
through a spontaneous reporting database called Adverse Event Reporting
System (AERS).132 AERS is a computerized information database designed
to support the FDA's postmarketing safety surveillance program. 3 3 AERS
receives information from two primary sources: mandatory reports from
sponsors on adverse events that have been spontaneously communicated to
them, and adverse event reports from physicians, and other health officials
that have voluntarily been submitted to the FDA's MedWatch program.134
information, as described in this section.").
127 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a). The following are a list of events which are included in the definition of
adverse drug experience: An adverse event occurring in the course of the use of a drug product in
professional practice; an adverse event occurring from drug overdose whether accidental or intentional;
an adverse event occurring from drug abuse; an adverse event occurring from drug withdrawal; and any
failure of expected pharmacological action. Id.
128 Id. ("Serious adverse drug experience. Any adverse drug experience occurring at any dose that
results in any of the following outcomes: Death, a life-threatening adverse drug experience, inpatient
hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization, a persistent or significant
disability/incapacity, or a congenital anomaly/birth defect.")
129 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b). This includes "information derived from commercial marketing
experience, postmarketing clinical investigations, postmarketing epidemiological/surveillance studies,
reports in the scientific literature, and unpublished scientific papers." Id.
130 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1)(i). "The applicant shall report each adverse drug experience that is
both serious and unexpected, whether foreign or domestic, as soon as possible but in no case later than
15 calendar days of initial receipt of the information by the applicant." Id.
131 Id. at § 314.80(c)(l)(ii). "The applicant shall promptly investigate all adverse drug experiences
that are the subject of these postmarketing 15-day Alert reports and shall submit followup reports within
15 calendar days of receipt of new information or as requested by FDA." Id.
132 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 57 (discussing the FDA's use of Adverse Event Reporting
System). See generally New Molecular Entity (NME) Post-Marketing Safety Evaluation Pilot Program
Progress Report, http://www.fda.gov/CDER/drug/postmarketingsafety/progress_
report.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (describing the core function of OSE as reviewing the
postmarketing safety of a marketed drug).
133 See FDA, Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), http://www.fda.gov/cder/aerssub/
default.htm (explaining how the AERS allows the FDA to efficiently monitor and respond to
postmarketing safety reports); see also Shea et al., supra note 11, at 446 (describing the Adverse
Reporting System).
134 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 57 (explaining how the AERS receives information enabling it
to perform its oversight function); see also Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), supra note 133
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Other reports come from sponsors' clinical studies. 135 Clinical reviewers
evaluate the AERS reports and search for safety "signals," which are
previously unrecognized or unlabeled serious adverse events. 136 Once a
signal is found, the next step is to look for additional cases in AERS,
medical literature or other databases such as those from foreign regulatory
agencies.137 After other cases are found, OSE physicians, who frontline the
surveillance program, search for any risk factors, common trends, or causal
relationships of the drug.138 The physicians may then confirm potential
signals by conducting studies in one of several large population-based
databases that link prescriptions with adverse outcomes. 139 These studies
are primarily conducted by specialized investigators who are affiliated with
departments of pharmacoepidemiology and pharmacy, in places such as
universities and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).140
After confirmation of a signal, the FDA must decide whether to take
(describing the AERS in general); FDA, MedWatch, http://www.fda.gov/
medwatch/What.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008)) (noting that MedWatch is the FDA Safety Information
and Adverse Event Reporting Program and how it provides information about safety issues involving
medical products as well as pharmaceutical drugs); FDA, Voluntary Reporting by Heath Professionals,
http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/report/hcp.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (explaining how Form FDA
3500 is for voluntary reporting and Form FDA 3500A is for mandatory reporting).
135 See GAO, supra note 85, at 5-7. Observational studies are also submitted to the FDA for
review of adverse events. Id. at 6-7. Observational studies are different from clinical studies in that the
investigator has no control over the therapy but merely observes. Id. at 7 n. 11. Whereas in clinical
studies, the investigator purposely manipulates the therapy to discover any causal relationships. Id. at 7.
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD PIARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES AND
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGiC ASSESSMENT 4 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/CDER/
GUIDANCE/6359OCC.pdf, notes that clinical studies triggering signals of an adverse event may be
submitted to the sponsor or directly to the FDA.
136 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58 (noting that postmarketing safety evaluators are the first to
scrutinize data submitted to AERS); see also GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES, supra note 135,
at 4 (stating that the quality of the reports is necessary for appropriate and effective evaluation).
137 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58. Some common signs are: temporal association, coherence
with existing information or biological plausibility, similar effect in drugs of the same class, dose-
response relationship, consistency of the association, and specificity of association. Id. Temporal
association is when the adverse outcome happens before the target drug was taken, and consistency of
the association means the replicability of results. Id. GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES, supra
note 135, at 6, states that in addition to AERS, additional cases may be identified through the Vaccine
Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS).
138 See GAO, supra note 85, at 16 (explaining that the safety evaluators must determine whether
the adverse events are drug related); see also Ahmad, supra note 123, at 57-58 (emphasizing the
importance of physicians' and other health care officials' roles in FDA's postmarketing surveillance
system).
139 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58 (noting that the FDA uses extramural investigators to
confirm signals); see also GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES, supra note 135, at 14 (discussing
the use of "thorough database search strategies based on updated coding terminology").
140 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58 (noting that investigators have access to a variety of
databases); see also SUSAN THAUL, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, DRUG SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS:
ISSUES AND ACTION OPTIONS AFTER FDA APPROVAL 15-16 (2005) (arguing that HMOs or universities
might be better situated to perform postmarket reviews than the government).
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regulatory action, and if so, what kind of action to take. 141 This is done by
considering the results of the safety analysis in the context of other factors,
such as the availability of other similar drugs and the condition the drug is
designed to treat.142 There are a variety of regulatory actions taken by the
FDA if the adverse event is severe enough.143 For example, the FDA can
require sponsors to send warning letters to prescribers of the drug,
identifying the specific hazard, and adding to or strengthening warning
information in the drug's labeling.144 The FDA may also issue public
health advisories concerning the specific use of a drug, and may even
restrict the distribution of the drug. 145 Furthermore, in rare instances, a drug
may be withdrawn from the market either voluntarily by the sponsor, or by
the FDA's action.146 However, drugs have been voluntarily removed in
almost all withdrawal cases. 147 While the FDA has limited authority to
141 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58 (listing factors that may help the FDA decide whether
regulatory action is necessary); see also THAUL, supra note 140, at 9 (discussing the types of regulatory
actions that the FDA might take in response to an adverse event, like letters to health professionals).
142 See GAO, supra note 85, at 17 (explaining that the Office of New Drugs staff within the review
divisions determine what, if any, regulatory action should be taken); see also THAUL, supra note 140, at
2 (discussing the Congressional hearings regarding COX-2 inhibitors: "[a]fter weighing the evidence on
the safety and risk-to-benefit of Vioxx and similar drugs").
143 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58 (noting that factors such as the seriousness of the adverse
events, the availability and safety of alternative therapy, and the outcome of past regulatory
intervention, are all important considerations in the determining regulatory action); see also THAUL,
supra note 140, at 9 (suggesting that withdrawal from the market is the most extreme and rarely used
action).
144 Ahmad, supra note 122, 58-59. Examples of recent FDA regulatory actions include: the
demand of additional postmarketing reports associated with Clozaril, the addition of a black box
warning in the labeling of Serzone, and the strengthening of the warnings, precautions, and adverse
reactions section of labeling for Actos and Avandia. Id. Table 1, "Recent Safety-based Drug
Withdrawals" provides a list of recent drug withdrawals and their respective adverse events. Id. at 59.
Gerald F. Masoudi, Legal Developments in the Enforcement of Food and Drug Law, 63 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 585, 587 (2008), comments that the FDA can require sponsors to engage in other communications
such as sending letters to health care professionals or disseminating information to health care providers
through professional societies.
145 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 59 (referring to two antifungal treatments, Sporanox and
Lamisil, its association for serious hepatic events, and possible association of serious cardiac adverse
events); see also Jacobson & Feigal, supra note 97, at 539 (showing that among the FDA's
communication tools are public health advisories to inform the public).
146 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2008) (allowing the FDA to propose withdrawal when it determines
that a drug is unsafe under conditions of use approved in its application); see also Ahmad, supra note
122, at 59 (noting that the drug cerivastatin "was voluntarily withdrawn from the market by the drug's
manufacturer following serious reports of rhabdomyolysis in association with its use"); see also GAO,
supra note 85, at 10 ("FDA does not have explicit authority to require that drug sponsors take other
safety actions; however, when FDA identifies a potential problem, sponsors generally negotiate with
FDA to develop a mutually agreeable remedy to avoid other regulatory action.").
147 See GAO, supra note 85, at 10 ("Since 2000 there have been 10 drug withdrawals for safety
reasons, and in all of these cases the drug's sponsors voluntarily removed the drug from the market.");
see also Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons From Vioxx and
Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 741, 742 (2005) (stating that voluntarily withdrawing
a drug from the market leaves open the possibility that the drug can be returned to the market more
readily as well as playing a better role before the jury in subsequent litigation).
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require that sponsors conduct postmarket safety studies, sponsors will
usually agree to revise drug labels or restrict distribution, to prevent
removal of the drug. 148
2. Problems with Postmarketing Surveillance System
The collection of ADE is practically the only statutorily-established tool
for postmarket surveillance.' 49 Although the spontaneous reporting system
has been somewhat effective in identifying latent drug-related problems,
there is plenty of room for improvement.150 The majority of problems with
the surveillance program can be classified as problems of under-reporting
and inadequacy of the information itself.151 Three barriers to reporting of
adverse events are: recognizing of ADE, reporting within the institution,
and reporting to the FDA.152 Recognition of a potential relationship
between a drug and an adverse event may be difficult due to the common
occurrence of certain medical conditions.153 If a drug only amplifies the
frequency of that medical condition, it will be difficult to distinguish that
condition from a true adverse event. 154 Moreover, there is often a time
148 See GAO, supra note 85, at 43 (citing the voluntary withdrawal of Baycol by sponsors after
communications concerning the risk of breakdown of muscle fibers); see also Epstein, supra note 147,
at 741-42, 744 (noting the withdrawal of Vioxx and Rezulin from the market voluntarily after findings
concerning the drugs' possibility as a "killer drug").
149 See Bright, supra note 11, at 609 (emphasizing the difference between the number of FDA-
created postmarket tools and the number of law-created tools); see also Schanz, supra note 7, at 493
(revealing that The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) contains a provision permitting the FDA to
monitor the progress of drugs postmarket).
150 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 298 ("Manufacturers are required to pass along reports that they
receive from doctors and others in the field, but they have no baseline obligation to develop their own
data-gathering efforts or otherwise to track clinical experiences in an organized manner."); see also
Barbara J. Evans & David A. Flockhart, The Unfinished Business of U.S. Drug Safety Regulation, 61
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 53 (2006) (highlighting the fact that only one to ten percent of all adverse events
that occurred were reported to FDA, as well as only one third to one half of all serious adverse events).
But see Bright, supra note 11, at 609 (stating that the primary basis of ADE surveillance is the least
expensive method of monitoring in the world).
151 See Bright, supra note 11, at 610 ("Underreporting is such a significant problem that even if
steps are taken to increase reporting, independent sources of information on ADE are critical."); see
also Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58 (discussing the shortcomings of spontaneous reporting, which
contribute to underreporting).
152 Bright, supra note 11, at 609 ("There are many barriers to reporting ADE to FDA, which can be
divided by reporting step: recognition, reporting within the institution, and reporting to FDA."); see
Goldman, supra note 16, at 514 (stating that other barriers include the complexities of risk
communication and risk management in the postmarketing realm).
153 See Bright, supra note 11, at 609 (addressing the possible reasons for the lack of recognition of
a relationship between a drug and ADE); Steenburg, supra note 2, at 299 (arguing that the amplified
frequency of medical conditions that commonly occur may be mistaken for a safety "signal").
154 See GAO, supra note 85, at 24 (stating that the magnitude of drug safety problems is difficult to
establish because the FDA cannot determine the proper frequency of ADEs using AERS data); see also
Bright, supra note 11, at 609 (noting that an ADE may go unrecognized if it can be "reasonably
explained by other causes").
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delay from when a drug is used to the occurrence of the ADE that interferes
with establishing causal relationships.155 The ADE may even occur in a
different location of the body from the actual location that was targeted in
testing, which further complicates the identification of causal relationships
and overall recognition of ADEs.156
If a potential causal relationship is identified, there are additional
obstacles in the reporting phases that reduce the surveillance system's
effectiveness.1 57 For instance, many ADEs fail to be reported because they
are thought to be already known or resolved.15 8 Also, those who discover
ADEs may be concerned about being blamed for the ADE, and may
hesitate to report it.159 As a result, only a small fraction of the adverse
events that occur are actually reported to the FDA.160 Data reported to the
FDA covers only one to ten percent of all adverse events that actually
occur, and between one third and one half of all the serious adverse
events. 161 Thus, the FDA's MedWatch program, although useful, is
undermined by the fact that only a small percentage of reports come from
healthcare providers and patients. 162
155 Bright, supra note 11, at 609 (suggesting that a lack of recognition can be explained by the time
delay between drug use and ADE); see LEWIS R. GOLDFRANK ET AL., GOLDFRANK'S TOXICOLOGIC
EMERGENCIES 1759 (7th ed. 2002) (providing an example of a "type B" ADE that develops over a
period of several days to weeks).
156 Bright, supra note 11, at 609. It is possible for an ADE to occur in a different organ system than
that being treated by the drug. Cf Charles L. Bennett & Cara C. Tigue, Overcoming Barriers to
Reporting Adverse Drug Events, MEDSCAPE PHARMACISTS, May 29, 2008, http://www.medscape.com
/viewarticle/574523. Often, toxicity profiles of new agents in drugs are not fully characterized at the
time of FDA approval. Id. Thus, if clinicians are unfamiliar with certain agents and their effect on
certain parts of the body, these parts may go untested and the ADE will not be recognized. Id.
157 Bright, supra note 11, at 609-10 (stating that even if a relationship between a drug and ADE is
recognized, there are still many barriers to reporting ADE); see Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58
(discussing the limitations of spontaneous reporting, including poor and infrequent documentation).
158 See Bright, supra note I1, at 610. If an ADE is already known, it is publicized or already listed
on the label. Id. Martin S. Manno, Preventing Adverse Drug Events, 36 NURSING 2006 3 56, 58 (2006)
available at http://www.nursingcenter.com/library/JournalArticle.asp?ArticleID
=633458, notes that health care professionals may underreport ADEs if the anticipated benefits of a
drug outweigh the risk of developing an anticipated adverse reaction.
159 Bright, supra note 11, at 610. "[T]he healthcare provider... could be concerned about being
blamed for the ADE . I..." Id. Another unfortunate reason for under-reporting is as simple as the
reporter being too busy. Id. Manno, supra note 158, at 59, comments that sadly, a person who
administers a drug causing ADE is more likely to be blamed than the flawed ADE reporting system.
160 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58 (explaining that the extent of under-reporting depends on the
severity of the ADE, among several other factors); see also Evans & Flockhart, supra note 150, at 53
(criticizing the FDA's failure to use certain periodical reports of adverse events in a "systematic goal-
setting process to reduce their frequency").
161 Evans & Flockhart, supra note 150, at 53 ("[I]t is estimated that data reported to FDA cover
only one to ten percent of all adverse events that actually occur, and between one third and one half of
all the serious adverse events."); see Basquill, supra note 1, at 79 (indicating that the actual rate of ADE
reporting may even be lower than ten percent).
162 Bright, supra note 11, at 610. Manufacturers mostly report to MedWatch and these reports are
based on reports from their sales staff or product complaints they received from their customers. Id.
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Assuming ADEs have been reported, the information itself is frequently
poorly documented, forcing the reviewer to contact the reporter.163
Contacting the reporter may even require going through the manufacturer
first, which significantly delays the overall process.164 More specifically,
problems such as inadequate and incomplete drug descriptions and little or
no data on the extent of drug use are all too common. 165 Due to the
structure of ADE reports, they often emphasize adverse outcomes and
completely neglect successful uses of the drug.166 Full extent of drug use,
including successful use, is imperative for the accuracy of calculations.167
Similarly, limited information compromises risk calculations, due to the
lack of detail in underlying problems of the drug.168 Altogether, these
problems create difficulties in analyzing adverse events and impede the
overall surveillance system.169
Goldman, supra note 16, at 522, notes that patients or healthcare providers completed only eighteen
percent of reports filed between 1993-1998.
163 Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58 ("One of the limitations of spontaneous reports is that, in general,
they are poorly documented, and the safety evaluator may need to contact the event reporter .... "); see
Cameron Rhudy, How Congress May Have Failed Consumers with the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007, 27 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 99, 102 (2008) (citing poor documentation as an
"obvious criticism" of MedWatch).
164 See Ahmad, supra note 122, at 58 (suggesting that adequate documentation at the initial stage
stands to expedite the entire process); see also Rhudy, supra note 163, at 102 (recognizing that
corporations are often disinclined to release information that is detrimental to them).
165 Bright, supra note 11, at 610 (calculating the true frequency is difficult, which in turn, makes it
difficult to establish the magnitude of a safety problem); see GAO, supra note 85, at 24-28 (noting that
there are many difficulties in obtaining complete and reliable data experienced by regulatory
authorities).
166 Bright, supra note 11, at 610 ("The nature of ADE reports emphasizes cases of adverse
outcome and ignores instances of successful use."); see FDA, MedWatch Reporting Forms,
http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/getforms.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2008) (providing only the forms that
enable reports of incidents of adverse effects).
167 Bright, supra note 11, at 610 ("Since there is no inherent mechanism for reporting the total
amount of both successful and unsuccessful drug use, risks related to drug use are not readily
calculated."); see Struve, supra note 94, at 603-04 (suggesting that the amount, quality, and subject
matter of reports filed factors into their overall usefulness).
168 Bright, supra note 11, at 610 ("Many significant problems are discovered and addressed by the
manufacturers well before FDA recognizes the problem or takes action. Conversely, manufacturers may
not sufficiently address problems with their products until FDA also becomes aware of them."); see
Rhudy, supra note 163, at 102 (noting the voluntary nature of the reports on which MedWatch relies
may result in underreporting).
169 See Bright, supra note 11, at 610 (noting that no one problem is entirely to blame for
difficulties in such analysis); see also Steenburg, supra note 2, at 298 (commenting on the "difficulty
evaluating the data without a clear sense of the relevant 'denominator' - the number of people meeting
a given profile of interest, often based on demographic and medical factors").
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II. EUROPE AND JAPAN
A. Europe
The European Union's market for pharmaceutical products is highly
regulated.170 Contrary to the U.S., close to eighty percent of pharmaceutical
regulatory activity in the EU is devoted to postmarket monitoring and
safety.]71 Such close attention to postmarketing activity gives rise to two of
the largest differences between pharmaceutical regulation in the U.S. and
the EU - the EU's system of personal and criminal liability' 72 and their
extensive inspections program.173 The pharmacovigilance program varies
under the EU's two decentralized and centralized systems.174 In the
decentralized process, the EMEA is responsible for coordinating
pharmacovigilance activities, and ensuring that pharmacovigilance is the
"collective responsibility of the member states." 175 The EMEA maintains
170 See Matthews & Wilson, supra note 16, at 407 (discussing examples from the European Union
of "widespread monitoring" while on the market "in addition to assessment and pre-market
authorization of new pharmaceutical products"); see also Teresa Pechulis Buono, Note, Biotechnology-
Derived Pharmaceuticals: Harmonizing Regional Regulations, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 133,
158 (1995) (examining the EU's recognition of environmental considerations in the approval process).
171 See Matthews & Wilson, supra note 16, at 419 (positing that pharmacovigilancc, the EU's
system for postmarketing regulation, is "a time-consuming process comprising 80 percent of
pharmaceutical regulatory activity"); see also Goldman, supra note 16, at 527 (discussing the EU
regulatory documents which provide detailed guidance for postmarket surveillance).
172 See Goldman, supra note 16, at 524 (noting that the pharmacovigilance system in Europe "is
under strict legal obligations entailing personal financial and criminal liability"); see also Matthews &
Wilson, supra note 16, at 416 (indicating that liability is borne by institutions themselves and not
simply the countries that recommended market authorization for the product).
173 See European Comm'n, Volume 9A of the Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the
European Union: Guidelines on Pharmacovigilance for Medicinal Products for Human Use, 29-33
(Mar. 2007) [hereinafter Volume 9A], available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
pharmaceuticals/eudralex/vol-9/pdf/vol9_2007-07_upd07.pdf (detailing the various types of
pharmacovigilance inspections); see also Goldman, supra note 16, at 527-28 (describing the
pharmacovigilance inspection process).
174 See Matthews & Wilson, supra note 16 at 408-20. Pharmaceutical regulation in the EU has
developed into a centralized and decentralized market. Id. at 420. First, the 1965 Directive 65/65/EEC
created a centralized framework for pharmaceutical approval. Id. at 408. The Committee for Proprietary
Medicinal Products (now known as the CHMP), was also developed to function as a "'central
clearinghouse for drug approvals submitted to any single European State."' Thomas, supra note 59, at
374 (quoting David V. Eakin, The International Conference on Harmonization of Pharmaceutical
Regulations: Progress or Stagnation?, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 221, 224 (1999)). Under the multi-
state procedure for authorization, if a manufacturer was approved by at least one state, it could apply for
approval in up to five other states in the EU. Id. at 374-75. However, discretion of approval was left to
each state's regulatory agencies. Id. at 374. In 1993, problems with the multi-state procedure led to the
development of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA), which "provide[d] a centralized
system for approving pharmaceuticals." Id. at 374. Although EMEA approves pharmaceutical sales in
any EU nation, the option of single-state approval still exists, and is now referred to as decentralized
mutual recognition. Matthews & Wilson, supra note 16, at 412. A third method of approval is "a
country-by-country basis via national registration procedures," which primarily applies to new drug
applicants. Id.
175 Matthews & Wilson, supra note 16, at 420.
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clinical results, as well as a database of reports of serious reactions to drugs
that were approved through mutual recognition.176 Pharmacovigilance in
the centralized procedure is executed by the CHMP, which monitors any
variations or modifications to an existing market authorization.177 The
CHMP analyzes evidence and formulates opinions on emerging safety
concerns. 178 Postmarket monitoring is conducted through the EU's network
of national medicines agencies, in close cooperation with healthcare
professionals and the pharmaceutical companies themselves. 179 Volume 9A
of the Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European Union:
Guidelines on Pharmacovigilance for Medicinal Products for Human Use,
is a complete set of guidelines, requirements, procedures and roles for both
Marketing Authorization Holders (drug manufacturers/sponsors) and
Competent Authorities (regulatory bodies of each EU state). 180 The
majority of pharmacovigilance legislation is contained in Chapter 3 of
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and Title LX of Directive 2001/83/EC.181
Under this authority, each MAH must ensure that it has an appropriate
system of pharmacovigilance and risk management in place in order to
176 Thomas, supra note 59, at 375 ("The EMEA maintains clinical outcomes evidence of
pharmaceuticals approved through the centralized system. It also compiles and maintains of reports
from national regulatory bodies of 'serious' reactions to pharmaceuticals approved through mutual
recognition."); see Markus Schott, Medical Research on Humans: Regulation in Switzerland, the
European Union, and the United States, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 63 (2005) (stating that every EU
country must enter a European-wide database, which is only open to the countries' "competent
authorities, the Commission, and the (EMEA], which operates it").
177 Matthews & Wilson, supra note 16, at 420 ("Under the centrali[z]ed procedure,
pharmacovigilance work is carried out by the CPMP ...."); see EMEA, Overview of the Committee
for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP), http://www.emea.europa.eu/htms/general/
contacts/CHMP/CHMP.html (enumerating the various responsibilities of the CHMP, which include
"several post-authori[z]ation and maintenance activities").
178 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 16. "The Agency's scientific committee, the CHMP ... is
responsible for evaluating evidence and formulating Opinions on emerging safety concerns with
centrally authori[z]ed products ...." Id. If a drug is deemed hazardous, EMEA's "rapid alert" system
notifies other national authorities, and a formal CHMP Opinion is published. Matthews & Wilson,
supra note 16, at 420. The Opinion is a determination on whether the drug should be withdrawn from
the market. Id. Because the publication may take up to six months, the product may be suspended from
the market until a final determination is issued. Id.
179 See EMEA, supra note 177 (noting that for every centrally authorized product on the market, a
European Public Assessment Report (EPAR) is published, providing scientific data as to the reasons for
granting authorization, as well as a summary of product characteristics); see also Richard F. Kingham et
al., The New European Medicines Agency, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 301, 313-14 (1994) (describing the
reporting process, which involves the agencies, healthcare professionals, and the pharmaceutical
companies).
180 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 13 (describing the purpose of the guidelines in EC Volume
9A); see also Goldman, supra note 16, at 527 (noting the guidance that Volume 9A provides).
181 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 14 (providing the legal framework for pharmacovigilance);
see also Thomas Gehring & Sebastian Krapohl, Supranational Regulatory Agencies Between
Independence and Control: The EMEA and the Authorization of Pharmaceuticals in the European
Single Market, 14:2 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 208, 218 (2007) (describing Regulation (EC) 726/2004 and
Directive 2001/83/EC as the sources for legal criteria concerning testing of human medicine).
2009] DRUG SAFETY
assure responsibility and liability for its products on the market and to
ensure that appropriate action can be taken. 182 Article 8(3)(n) of Directive
2001/83/EC mandates that MAHs appoint a Qualified Person Responsible
for Pharmacovigilance (QPPV).183 This is one of the most effective
features of pharmacovigilance, and ensures compliance from manufacturers
and promotes drug safety. A QPPV is responsible for maintaining the
database of information about all suspected adverse reactions that are easily
accessible to the EU.184 A QPPV must prepare Adverse Reaction reports
and Periodic Safety Update Reports (PSUR), monitor the safety of a
product throughout its lifetime, and respond to requests for information
from other agencies. 185 A QPPV is financially and criminally liable for
failure to fulfill these postmarketing obligations.186 Highly detailed
descriptions of the pharmacovigilance system, organizational charts,
documented procedures, and comprehensive databases are among the many
requirements a QPPV must fulfill, and are set out in Volume 9A. 187
The pharmacovigilance program also has a specialized Inspections
provision. Inspections of a MAH's pharmacovigilance systems are either
routine or 'for cause' and are conducted by the Competent Authority of the
state in whose territory the QPPV is located.188 National inspection
182 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 15 (describing the responsibilities of MAH); see also Ivana
Hanzl-Dujmovid et al., Issues with Regulatory Pharmacovigilance in East European Countries: The
Industry Perspective, 2007 TOXICOLOGY LETTERS 168, 228-29 (outlining the new requirements for
pharmacovigilance in the European Union).
183 Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 18. "QPPV should be appropriately qualified, with documented
experience in all aspects of pharmacovigilance in order to fulfill the responsibilities and tasks of the
post. If the QPPV is not medically qualified, access to a medically qualified person should be
available." Id. A QPPV should "[h]ave experience in all aspects of pharmacovigilance and if not
medically qualified (do not have a medical degree) should report to, or have access to a medically
qualified person." MHRA, Qualified Persons for Pharmacovigilance, http://www.mhra.
gov.uk/home/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeId=680 (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
184 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 19 (describing the role of the QPPV as overseer of the
pharmacovigilance QPPV); see also MHRA, supra note 183 (listing that a QPPV is responsible for
"[t]he establishment and maintenance of a system which ensures that information about all suspected
adverse reactions which are reported to the personnel of the registration holder ... is collected and
collated in order to be accessible at lease at one point within the Community").
185 See Council Regulation 726/2004, art. 24, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 1 (EC) (ordering the creation of
safety reports and describing their distribution); see also MHRA, supra note 183 (listing the
responsibilities of the QPPV).
186 See Goldman, supra note 16, at 524. QPPV serves as an advocate for compliance of
pharmacovigilance activities. U.S. currently has no one like QPPV in its system. Id. The criminal and
financial liability extends to the institution that authorizes the product. See Matthews & Wilson, supra
note 16, at 416.
187 Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 21-25 (describing the requirements of MAH in applying for its
authorization and how it is to maintain its pharmacovigilance program).
188 See Id. at 29 (providing guidance on pharmacovigilance inspections); see also Patricia
Fitzgerald, Pharmacovigilance Inspections, 40 INDIAN J. OF PHARMACOLOGY S21, S21 (2008)
(detailing inspection procedures in the UK).
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programs, such as the UK's Medicine and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency (MHRA), generally conduct these inspections.18 9  Routine
inspections are used to determine whether a MAH has the necessary
personnel, systems, and facilities in place to meet its regulatory
obligations. 190 'For cause' inspections are those that are triggered by safety
issues, suspected violations of pharmacovigilance legislation, or by request
of the CHMP.191 MHRA requires MAHs to complete a Summary of
Pharmacovigilance Systems (SPS), which assists the MAH and the
Inspectorate to prepare for the inspection.192 The Pharmacovigilance
Inspectorate Unit of MHRA consists of inspectors who have acquired a
certain level of expertise in their specialized fields.193 As a result, they are
able to gain a deep understanding in their specialized areas.194 The
inspections themselves consist of site visits during which interviews,
document and computer system reviews (including searches of any
pharmacovigilance databases) are performed.195 If a MAH fails to comply
189 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 30 (explaining that the Competent Authority of the Member
State is responsible for the inspection of the pharmacovigilance system in the territory where the QPPV
is located); see also MHRA, About Us, http://www.mhra.gov.uk/home/
idcplg?ldcService=SSGET PAGE&nodeld=20 (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (describing MHRA's goals
and functions in the UK); MHRA, Inspections and Standards: Good Pharmacovigilance Practice,
http://www.mhra.gov.uk/home/idcplg?ldcService=SS GET PAGE&nodeld=826 (last visited Oct. 1,
2008) [hereinafter Inspections and Standards] (stating that UK MAHs undergo routine national
inspections on a periodic basis).
190 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 30 (discussing how inspections determine that the Market
Authorization Holder's personnel, systems, and facilities are pursuant to the regulatory obligations for
centrally authorized products); see also Inspections and Standards, supra note 189 (commenting that the
inspections are meant to ensure that the systems and procedures used by MAHs comply with existing
EU and national pharmacovigilance regulations and guidance).
191 Inspections and Standards, supra note 189; see Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 30-31. Triggers
for inspection that relate to specific concerns about a product's safety or actual non-compliance include:
delays in carrying out or failure to carry out specific obligations or follow-up measures, delays in
reporting, incomplete reporting, submission of poor quality or incomplete PSURs, etc. Volume 9A,
supra note 173, at 31. Triggers that do not relate to concerns about a products safety are: MAH has not
previously been inspected, MAH has placed their first product on the market in the EEA, MAH has
recently been or is involved in merger or takeover process, and MAH has changed their system
significantly. Id.
192 See Inspections and Standards, supra note 189 (explaining that MAHs are required to complete
and submit a Summary of Pharmacovigilance Systems (SPS) document to the lead inspector which
assists in preparing for inspection); see also MHRA Statutory Pharmacovigilance Inspection, MHRA,
June 2006, available at http://www.mhra.gov.uk/home/idcplg?IdcService=
GET FILE&dD=21423&noSaveAs=l&Rendition=WEB (describing SPS as an invaluable tool used to
aid tie Pharmocovigilance Inspectorate in planning and preparation for upcoming inspections).
193 See Goldman, supra note 16, at 528. The inspectors generally specialize in physics, pharmacy,
chemistry, informational technology and biology. Id. Each inspector holds a warrant to assess
compliance with medical legislation. See Inspections and Standards, supra note 189.
194 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 31 (noting that product-specific inspections require the
inspector to focus specifically on a given product); Goldman, supra note 16, at 527-28 (contrasting
MHRA's Inspectorate with FDA's inspectors).
195 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 29 (indicating that the results of an inspection are provided
to Marketing Authorization Holder who will use the results to improve compliance and possibly as the
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with pharmacovigilance legislation, the EMEA, the European Commission,
or the competent Authority of the state will take necessary regulatory
action. 196
The chief obligation of Competent Authorities is to establish
pharmacovigilance systems that are compatible with the procedures
undertaken in other Member States and the Agency, in order that pertinent
data may be shared between Member States and EMEA.197 Each state
should have a spontaneous reporting program that allows for the collection,
maintenance and organization of suspected adverse reaction reports, as well
as other types of reports.198 In the centralized process, the Member States,
the European Commission, and the EMEA, all have unique roles and
responsibilities that contribute to the overall pharmacovigilance process. 199
Member States must be able to provide adverse reaction information to the
EMEA, and identify safety concerns through a national pharmacovigilance
system.200 The EMEA's role is to continuously collect and coordinate
information on pharmacovigilance systems for all centrally authorized
products.201 The European Commission serves as the enforcement of legal
basis for enforcement action); Inspections and Standards, supra note 189 (explaining that inspectors
have a right under Medicines Act 1968 to enter premises covered by the act to conduct inspections, take
samples, require the production of books, and to take copies of the books and documents).
196 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 33. Regulatory action ranges from additional inspections, to
warnings, and possibly even revocation of authorization of the drug. Id. "In the event that the overall
risk-benefit balance is considered to be unfavourable and proposed risk minimi[z]ation measures are
considered inadequate to redress the balance, the medicinal product should be withdrawn from the
market and Healthcare Professionals and Patients/the public should be informed as appropriate." Id. at
106.
197 See Id. at 109 (proscribing the pharmacovigilance systems that must be established); see also
Inspections and Standards, supra note 189 (describing the function of the Unit as to assess
pharmaceutical companies compliance with EU and UK legislation in terms of monitoring the safety of
medicines given to patients).
198 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 110. "Each Member State should have in place a system for
the collection of spontaneous suspected adverse reaction reports from Healthcare Professionals,
Marketing Authori[z]ation Holders and, where appropriate, from Patients/Consumers." Id. Other duties
include: receipt, validation, and processing of individual case safety reports, signal detection, assessing
periodic safety update reports, and evaluating data from company-sponsored post-authorization safety
studies, etc. Id. at 111-16. Competent authorities of Member States are required to collect and report all
relevant information concerning suspected adverse reactions to the Authority. See Commission
Regulation 726/2004, art. 22, 2004 O.J. (L136) 12.
199 See Volume 9A, supra note 173 at 123 (stating that pharmacovigilance is based on the
respective roles and obligations of each party). See generally Commission Regulation 726/2004, supra
note 198, at I (providing explicit Community procedures for the authorization and postmarketing
supervision of medicinal products, and establishing the EMEA as the centralized authority for
approving pharmaceuticals).
200 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 131 (listing the specific roles and responsibilities of Member
States); see also Commission Regulation 726/2004, supra note 198, at art. 28 (mandating all Member
States to continually develop pharmacovigilance systems to ensure public safety).
201 See Volume 94, supra note 173 at 124 (noting the role of the Agency as the coordinator of the
pharmacovigilance system); Commission Regulation 726/2004, supra note 198, at art. 25 (stating the
Agency's obligation of collecting and forwarding information provided by Member States to the
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requirements and decisions by Member States and MLAHs.202 Under mutual
recognition, the Reference Member State (the first state that approved the
drug), usually leads in the analysis and monitoring of such serious adverse
reactions.2 03 Clearly, Volume 9A provides much greater detail as to which
pharmacovigilance activities should be covered by written procedures and
better reflects both the latest methods and risk management paradigm that
prevails internationally. 204
B. Japan
In Japan, postmarketing surveillance of pharmaceuticals and medical
devices is of greater importance than premarket and manufacturing
functions.205 Unlike the U.S., Japan devotes much of its time and effort into
regulating postmarket activities. Japan focuses on precautionary phases
and early intervention, as well as the reexamination/reevaluation periods to
ensure the drug's continuing safety and efficacy. 206 In recent years, the
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) has increased its
national pharmacovigilance systems).
202 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 132. The European Commission is responsible for
"[e]nforcement of legal requirements and enforcement of the implementation of Decisions by Member
States and Marketing Authoritz]ation Holders." Id. The Rapporteur is responsible for evaluating and
reaching conclusions on issues of post-authorization for centrally authorized drugs. Id. The regulation
sets forth procedures to be taken by the Commission when a manufacturer or importer is suspected of
failing to meet obligations set forth by the governing Directive, 2001/83/EC, on the Community code
relating to medicinal products for human use. See Commission Regulation 726/2004, supra note 198,
art. 20.
203 See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 138. RMS has the responsibility for evaluating all safety
concerns relevant to MRP or DCP products for providing Assessment Reports to the CMS. Id. The
CHMP Pharmacovigilance Working Party (PhVWP) serves as the discussion forum for all safety
concerns relating to the mutual recognition process. Id. Authorization Holders are required to obtain
information regarding all suspected serious adverse reactions from the reference Member State. See
Council Directive 2001/83/EC, art. 104(5)-104(6), 2001 O.J. (L311) 96.
204 See Goldman, supra note 16, at 527 (arguing that the Volume 9A guidelines "provide much
greater detail as to which pharmacovigilance activities should be covered by written procedures, and
better reflect both the latest methods and risk management paradigm that prevails internationally"); see
also Schanz, supra note 7, at 495-97 (noting that in 2007, the Institute of Medicine released a report
titled "The Future of Drug Safety," which found the FDA's postmarketing study commitments to be
lacking in priority).
205 See Neckers, supra note 12, at 306. Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare placed
greater importance on postmarketing surveillance of pharmaceutical and medical devices than in
premarket functions. Id. In 2002, Japan enacted revisions of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law by placing
greater emphasis on postmarketing duties, which reflected the government's efforts to ensure safety and
efficacy of medical products. See Martin A. Yahiro & Kiyohito Nakai, Japan's New Regulatory System,
MEDICAL DEVICELtNK, Oct. 2004, available at http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/
archive/04/10/015.html.
206 See Neckers, supra note 12, at 306 (stating that early postmarketing phase vigilance is one of
Japan's several initiatives to enhance prominence in the medical industry); see also Yahiro & Nakai,
supra note 205 (noting that Japan's revisions to PAL was an effort to ensure the safety and efficacy of
medical products).
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postmarketing efforts through various initiatives. 207 One of the main goals
of the revised Pharmaceutical Affairs Law of 2002 (PAL) was to reinforce
postmarketing safety regulations, by including reexamination of new drugs,
and the reevaluation of drugs.2 08 With the revised PAL, came the
establishment of the revised Good Post-marketing Surveillance Practice
(GPMSP) law, which was then divided into two parts. 209 The first
component, the Good Post-marketing Study Practice (GPSP) involves the
collection and preparation of materials for reexamination and
reevaluation.21 0 The GPSP specifies items that are to be strictly complied
with in order to achieve appropriate post-marketing surveillance and
studies conducted by manufacturers/distributors, and to assure the
reliability of data submitted when applying for reexamination or re-
evaluation. 211 The GPSP consists of twelve articles.212 Manufacturers or
207 See Neckers, supra note 12, at 306. Taking international conformity into account, the revised
PAL incorporated ICH's postmarketing surveillance theme. Id. The International Conference on
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) is
an attempt to harmonize the pharmaceutical rules and regulations of the U.S., Europe, and Japan, and
ultimately increases the effectiveness, quality and safety of medicines. See International Conference on
Harmonisation, http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-I.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). MHLW
regulates pharmaceutical affairs through its multiple bureaus. Neckers, supra note 12, at 306.
Established in April 2004, the Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) is an independent
administrative organization that is responsible for reviewing postmarketing and safety measures. See
Japan Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers Ass'n, English Regulatory Information Task Force,
Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan, at 13 (2006), available at
http://www.jpma.or.jp/english/paj/pdf/2006.pdf [hereinafter JPMA, ERITF]. Within the PMDA are
thirteen different departments, and one office, each with varying duties. Id.
208 See Neckers, supra note 12, at 298 (stating that the PAL was revised based on demands for
augmentation of safety assurance in keeping with the age of modem science and policies); JPMA,
ERITF, supra note 207, at 13 (explaining that the revisions were meant to address the enhancements in
the development and safety of new medical products in the twenty-first century).
209 See JPMA, ERTIF, supra note 207, at 103-04. The original GPMSP was merely an
administrative notification, rather than official law. Id. at 103. Under the 2004 PAL, the GPSMP was
"separate[ed] between the part that deals with the collection, preparation and consideration of
information for appropriate use of post-marketing safety measures ... and the part that deals with tests
and surveillance conducted to collect and prepare materials for reexamination and reevaluation." Id. at
104. Katharine Neckers' article traces the development of PAL law. See generally Neckers, supra note
12, at 297-98.
210 JPMA, ERTIF, supra note 207, at 104 (stating that in the revised PAL enforced in 2004, there
is a separation between the part that deals with the collection, preparation and consideration of
information for appropriate use of post-market safety measures of the MHLW Ordinance on GPMSP
related to the implementation of safety assurance measures, and the part that deals with tests and
surveillance conduct to collect and prepare materials for reexamination and reevaluation); see Neckers,
supra note 12, at 313-14 (noting that the first revision of the medical device regulations brought the
enforcement of the regulations to the level of international norms of the Standards for Collection and
Preparation of Material Concerning Approval Examination, as well as to the level required by Good
Laboratory Practices).
211 See JPMA, ERTIF, supra note 207, at 104 ("These standards set forth the items that must be
strictly complied with by manufacturers/distributors of drugs in conducting post-marketing surveillance
and studies."); see also Neckers, supra note 12, at 324 (claiming that postmarketing surveillance is
perhaps the most crucial phase in the development and manufacturing process of new drugs and devices
and without such strict regulations, recalls will continue in the future).
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distributors of drugs conduct post-marketing surveys for the purpose of
collecting, screening, confirming or verifying information that relates to the
quality, efficacy, and safety of drugs. 213 Compliance surveys are an integral
part of the reexamination and reevaluation processes of the GPSP.214 These
surveys are performed by employees of the Pharmaceutical and Medical
Devices Agency (PMDA) and are used as the basis of a data compliance
survey - after which a determination of the manufacturer's compliance or
non-compliance is made.2 15
The second component, the "Good Vigilance Practice" (GVP),
"establishes standards for post-marketing safety management related to the
collection, preparation, and study of proper use of information on drugs,
etc., and to the implementation of measures for safety assurance." 2 16 The
GVP is outlined in sixteen articles. 2 17 A recent initiative called early phase
postmarketing vigilance (EPPV) aims "to have pharmaceutical companies
provide and draw attention of medical professionals to accurate information
212 JPMA, ERTIF, supra note 207, at 104-08. Article I states the purpose of the GPSP standards.
Id. at 104. Article 2 defines terms such as post-marketing surveys, drug use-result survey, special drug
use-results survey, and post-marketing clinical study. Id. at 105. Article 3 specifies standard operating
procedures for post-marketing surveillance. Id. at 105. Article 4 declares the obligations of supervisors
of post-marketing surveys. Id. at 106. Article 5 specifies the use of post-marketing surveys. Id. at 106.
Article 6 specifies the use of drug use-results surveys. Id. at 107. Article 7 specifies the use of post-
marketing clinical studies. Id. at 107. Article 8 provides rules concerning in-house inspections. Id. at
107. Article 9 details the education and training that a supervisor of post-marketing surveys must have.
Id. at 107. Article 10 delegates duties of post-marketing surveys. Id. at 108. Article 11 describes the
process of preserving records in connection with post-marketing surveys. Id. at 108. Article 12 sets the
standards for compliance of reexamination and reevaluation of data in connection with post-marketing
surveillance. Id. at 108.
213 Id. at 105 (clarifying that drug use-results surveys, special drug use-results surveys, and post-
marketing clinical studies are other examples of surveys that are conducted by drug manufacturers); see
Neckers, supra note 12, at 306 (reporting that cooperation from regulatory authorities and healthcare
providers in funding these postmarket surveillance systems is also necessary for vast improvement).
214 See JPMA, ERTIF, supra note 207, at 108 (noting that the surveys are implemented in
accordance with the Guidance for Implementation of GPSP On-site surveys established by the MHLW);
see also THE WORKING GROUP, THE JAPAN SOCIETY FOR PRECISION ENGINEERING, FUTURE
POSTMARKETING SURVEILLANCE (PMS) IN JAPAN 4 (Yuka Ohgaki, Fumiko Miyaji, & Mikihito Kosuge
trans., 2003) [hereinafter JAPAN SOCIETY FOR PRECISION ENGINEERING], available at
http://www.jspe.jp/pmspdf/pmsen.pdf (specifying the ADRlinfection reporting, reexamination and
reevaluation as the major regulatory requirements for marketed drugs in Japan).
215 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at I (explaining the role of PMDA); see also Neckers,
supra note 12, at 315 (describing PMDA as the cornerstone of Japan's medical product regulation).
216 JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 109.
217 Id. at 109-17. Article I establishes the purpose of GVP. Id. at 109. Article 2 lists definitions of
terms: safety management information, quality assurance activities, early post-marketing surveillance,
and persons in charge of drug information and medical device information. Id. Articles 3 to 12 specify
the duties and obligations of general manufacturing/distribution supervisors. Id. at 109-16. Article 13
provides standards for post-marketing safety management of type 2 manufacturers/distributors. Id. at
116. Article 14 provides standards for post-marketing safety management of type 3
manufacturers/distributors. Id. Article 15 describes retention of records related to safety assurance. Id.
Article 13 and 14 both deal with standards for post-marketing safety management of type 2
manufacturers/distributors. Id.
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and promote understanding of proper use over a period of 6 months from
the launch of new products .... "218 This rapid collection of information on
serious adverse reactions would allow the MHLW to minimize the harmful
effects that people may experience. 219 This postmarketing vigilance phase
is invaluable because it produces "'thorough dissemination of information
on proper use and early acquisition of ADR information."' 220
Like the U.S. and EU, Japan also has an adverse drug reaction reporting
system, however, as previously mentioned, Japan implemented additional
systems for reexamination and reevaluation. 221 The three main bodies of
the reporting system are: the MHLW's drug safety information reporting
system, the adverse drug reaction reporting system by pharmaceutical
companies, and the World Health Organization's (WHO's) International
Drug Monitoring Program. 222 The MHLW's system collects safety
information from health professionals and all medical institutions and
pharmacies directly.223 Any adverse event, including well-known adverse
events, associated with the drug must be reported.2 24
Pharmaceutical companies, in accordance with the PAL, are obligated to
report adverse drug reactions and infections, serious cases, as well as
regulatory information, such as measures adopted in foreign countries to
218 Neckers, supra note 12, at 308 (quoting Japanese Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association,
One Year After Early Post-marketing Phase Vigilance Surveillance,
http://www.jpma.or.jp/english/events/topics/update/update25_g.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter JPMA, One Year After]).
219 See JPMA, One Year After, supra note 218 (stating that EPPV requests "companies to
cooperate in collection of ADR information and to take the necessary safety measures"); see also Akira
Kawahara, Post-Marketing Safety Measures in Japan, Apr. 2008, at 36, available at
http://www2.convention.co.jp/eaprs2008ph/presen/0414-B2-03.pdf (noting that the MHLW/PMDA's
mission statement is "to ensure faster access to more effective and safer pharmaceuticals, medical
devices for the public").
220 Neckers, supra note 12, at 309 (quoting JAPAN SOCIETY FOR PRECISION ENGINEERING, supra
note 214, at 15).
221 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 24 (providing the necessary procedures that
manufacturers/distributors must perform as part of the reexamination and reevaluation process); see
also Neckers, supra note 12, at 307 (stating that unlike Japan, "the United States does not employ re-
examination and re-evaluation requirements").
222 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 117 (describing each of the three main bodies); see also
MHLW, White Paper: Annual Report on Health and Welfare, Approval and Licensing System for
Drugs, Quasi-Drugs and Cosmetics, http://wwwl.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp_5/vol2/p2c5.html (last visited
Oct. 1, .2008) [hereinafter White Paper Report] (providing a chart of the structure of postmarketing
safety measures).
223 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 117 (stating that "the reporting format has been
simplified in order to further increase the number of reports from physicians, dentists, and
pharmacists"); see also Kawahara, supra note 219, at 12-13 (outlining two models of information
flow).
224 JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 117-19. Only "mild, well-known adverse events" do not
have to be reported. Id. at 117. Certain adverse events must be reported within 15 days when they are
first known, while others must be reported within 30 days. Id. at 118-19.
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discontinue manufacturing and/or distribution of a drug due to safety
concerns. 225 Certain adverse drug reactions are required to be reported
within fifteen days of the time that they are first discovered. 226 These cases
include: death, disability, and any other serious problems that may lead to
death.227 Other types of adverse reactions are to be reported within thirty
days from the time that they are first known. 228 The WHO's international
drug monitoring program collects data from member states, creates a
summary of the results, and sends the summary report to each country.229
The information that the MHLW receives from the other two bodies of the
system is then evaluated and any results must be approved by the
PAFSC.230 Any administrative and regulatory action is also determined at
this stage.231
Japan's reexamination system is "aimed at reconfirmation of the clinical
usefulness of drugs by performing GPSP or GVP as one aspect of PMS
[Postmarketing Strategy], through collecting information on the efficacy
225 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 118 (explaining Japan's standard operating procedures
for post-marketing safety management); see also Katherine A. Davis, An International Drug
Administration: Curing Uncertainty in International Pharmaceutical Product Liability, 18 NW. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 685, 720 (1998) (discussing Japan's pharmaceutical regulation procedures).
226 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 118. This fifteen-day requirement was "intended to
assure focused supervision of serious cases caused by adverse reactions of drugs with little post-
marketing clinical experience and to coordinate reporting criteria for adverse drug reactions with
international standards." Id. Article 62-2 of the Enforcement Regulations requires adverse reactions to
be reported by the manufacturer or in-country caretaker to the MHW. See G.R. HIGSON, MEDICAL
DEVICE SAFETY: THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 88 (2002).
227 JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 118-19 (stating examples of adverse drug reactions that must
be reported to the MHLW within fifteen days); see HIGSON, supra note 226, at 88 (noting that in
addition to death and disability, adverse reactions that are caused by suspected deficiencies in medical
devices used in Japan must also be reported within fifteen days).
228 JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 119 (listing the cases that "must be reported within 30 days
from the time they are first known"); see HIGSON, supra note 226, at 88 (distinguishing the adverse
drug reactions that must be reported within thirty days, as opposed to fifteen).
229 JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 120. The World Health Organization's drug monitoring
program facilitates the dissemination of information of adverse drug reactions to participating member
states. Id. Japan recently became a member of this program in 1972. Id. The monitoring program is a
collaborative effort between member states, including Japan, to manage drug safety. See The World
Health Organization - Uppsala Monitoring Center, WHO Programme for International Drug
Monitoring, http://www.who-umc.org/DynPage.aspxid=l 3140 (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
230 JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 8, 120. The MHLW evaluates drug safety information
received in consultation with PAFSC regarding adverse drug reactions. Id. at 120. The Pharmaceutical
Affairs and Food Sanitation Council (PAFSC) advises the MHLW, and reviews and discusses important
pharmaceutical and food sanitation-related matters. Id. at 8.
231 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 120. Administrative decisions are made as a result of
consultations with the PAFSC regarding adverse drug reactions. Id. The MHLW can suspend the
manufacturing or distribution of a drug, recall a drug, revoke approval, change its dosage, and order
emergency safety information to be circulated, etc. Id. The most frequent type of action taken is
requiring notification to health professionals, through revised versions of package inserts. Id. The
administrative actions performed by the MHLW reflect the information gathered in postmarketing
surveillance of drugs. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOPHARMACEUTICAL STATISTICS 628 (Shein-Chung
Chow ed., 2d ed. 2003).
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and safety of the drug during a specified period of time after approval." 232
Under this article, pharmaceutical companies must perform postmarketing
surveillance of their drugs within a certain number of years after their
approval, to be decided by the MHLW.233 Whereas reexamination focuses
on ensuring the drug's level of efficacy, the reevaluation system
concentrates on the quality and safety of the drug in the context of current
medical and pharmaceutical sciences. 234 The MHLW first selects certain
ingredients in drugs to review, and an initial review is performed by the
PMDA, who then discusses their data with PAFSC.235 Once reevaluation
has been designated, the PMDA performs the reevaluation and submits
their results on the drug's quality of efficacy and safety to the PAFSC to be
published. 236
III. REFORMS
A recent report by current and former members of the FDA's Drug
Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee pinpoints several flaws
of drug regulation.237 The members called for a "reorganization of the
232 JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 121; see White Paper Report, supra note 222 (providing a
flow chart of postmarketing surveys in the reexamination and reevaluation process).
233 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 122 (stating that general times for re-examination are 10,
6 and 4-6 years, after approval); see also Neckers, supra note 12, at 299 (explaining that the MHLW
requires postmarketing re-examination and re-evaluation of all newly approved drugs).
234 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 125 (discussing the reevaluation system). See generally
Tanaka Katsutoshi, Problems of Re-evaluation of Drug: Reexamination Systems (Review, Re-
evaluation, and GPMSP) of Drug for Medical Use, 17 CURRENT THERAPY 6, 984-89 (1999), available
at http://sciencelinks.jp/j-east/article/199921/000019992199AO602967.php (explaining the history and
process of re-evaluation).
235 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 131 (charting the reevaluation system); see also, Akira
Miyajima, Role of Japan and Asian Countries in the Global Pharmaceutical Development, PMDA, Oct.
12, 2006, at 4, http://www.pmda.go.jp/apec2006ph/presen/1012/03/pdf (illustrating the operational flow
of drug and device development).
236 See JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at 131 (graphing the steps in the reevaluation process);
Akira, supra note 235, at 4 (revealing the overall system and progression of drug and device
development).
237 See generally Furberg et al., supra note 117 at 1. The flaws include:
[T]he design of initial preapproval studies lets uncommon, serious adverse events go undetected;
massive underreporting of adverse events to the FDA postmarketing surveillance system reduces
the ability to quantify risk accurately; manufacturers do not fulfill the majority of their
postmarketing safety study commitments; the FDA lacks authority to pursue sponsors who violate
regulations and ignore postmarketing safety study commitments; the public increasingly perceives
the FDA as having become too close to the regulated pharmaceutical industry; the FDA's safety
oversight structure is suboptimal; and the FDA's expertise and resources in drug safety and public
health are limited.
Id. at 1. The Drug and Safety and Risk Management Drug Advisory Committee's purpose is to advise
the Commissioner regarding responsibilities of making sure drugs are safe for human use, advise on
risk management, risk communication, and evaluation of drugs. See FDA, Committee Charter Drug
Safety and Risk Management Drugs Advisory Committee, http://www.fda.gov/
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agency with emphasis on strengthening the evaluation and proactive
monitoring of drug safety," among other things. 238 The first step towards
reorganization that the FDA can make is to develop a current set of
guidelines and regulations to which drug manufacturers and FDA
employees can refer. 239 The FDA has recently taken some initiative in the
postmarketing program, yet these newly proposed regulations have not
been officially released or published.240 The FDA must promulgate
regulatory standards that "provide [the industry] with clearly written,
regularly updated documents" in order to encourage compliance. 241 In
comparison to its European and Asian counterparts, the FDA is clearly
lacking in this crucial area of pharmacovigilance. Europe's Volume 9A of
the Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European Union is a
complete and updated set of guidelines for postmarketing
pharmacovigilance regulation. 242 Likewise, Japan's report from JPMA's
English Regulatory Information Task Force, contains practices and
regulations of the pharmaceutical industry that are updated twice a year.243
In the U.S., the most current guidance on postmarketing safety for drugs is
based on regulations that were promulgated in 1997.244 A current set of
principles and guidelines for all parties to rely upon will provide the
foundation that the FDA needs to emphasize the importance of monitoring
drugs. 24 5
Cder/audiences/acspage/DSaRMcharter.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
238 Furberg et al., supra note 117, at 1.
239 See Goldman, supra note 16, at 514 ("[lit is incumbent upon national competent authorities to
promote regulatory standards that reflect the latest scientific developments, and provide regulated
industry with clearly written, regularly updated documents that foster compliance."); see also Furberg et
al., supra note 117, at 3 (asserting that the FDA needs to have "additional and clearer authority").
240 See Goldman, supra note 16, at 514 (noting that release of rules and regulations have been
delayed); Furberg et al., supra note 117, at I (asserting that "there has been no meaningful change in
our regulatory approach to drug safety during the past decades").
241 Goldman, supra note 16, at 514.
242 See supra notes 180-204 and accompanying text (describing the breadth and efficiency of
Volume 9A).
243 See generally JPMA, ERITF, supra note 207, at iii-vii. The JPMA English Regulatory
Information Task force meets twice a year to review any updates in: (1) the "Organization and Function
of the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare"; (2) "Pharmaceutical Laws and Regulations"; (3)
"Drug Development" Activities by the Industry and their evaluation by the Ministry; (4)
"Postmarketing Surveillance of Drugs"; (5) "Dissemination of Drug Information"; and (6) Health
Insurance Programs and Drug Pricing." Id.
244 Goldman, supra note 16, at 516 (explaining how rules proposed in 2003 have not been finalized
and as a result the 1997 rules still govern); see STEPHENS' DETECTION OF NEW ADVERSE DRUG
REACTIONS 433 (John Talbot & Patrick Waller eds., 5th ed. 2004) (stating that the FDA proposed rule
changes to the 1997 rules, but those proposed rules have yet to be enacted).
245 See Furberg et al., supra note 117, at I (noting that there have been only small changes made to
the regulatory approach in the past few decades, none of which have changed the status quo in any
meaningful way); see also Further Actions Needed to Improve FDA 's Postmarket Decision-Making
Process: Hearing on Drug Safety Before the Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
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For its next mission, the FDA should focus on improving its monitoring
of postmarketing study commitments that drug sponsors agree to
conduct. 246 Similar to the QPPV in Europe, each drug sponsor should have
one executive that is responsible for maintaining a postmarketing
system. 247 This executive should be held criminally liable for failure to
fulfill any of their postmarketing monitoring obligations, as personal
responsibility will serve as an incentive for ensuring an effective
postmarketing system.248 Also, the FDA must receive more statutory tools
for monitoring commitments and ASRs, and for ensuring that commitments
are being completed according to schedule. 249 Within the past few years,
Congress has been pressured to provide the FDA with stronger
enforcement tools.250 For failure to complete postmarketing studies within
the time specified, The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
Accountability Act of 2005, introduced by Representatives Stark and
Berry, proposes fines of up to $5 million for each month the study remains
incomplete. 251 Because of the FDA's unsubstantiated threat of withdrawal,
companies often "drag their feet on studies." 252 However, with this bill,
110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of Marcia Crosse, Director, Health Care) [hereinafter Further Actions
Needed] (reporting that the GAO testified that it advised FDA to take steps to make cooperation among
regulatory parties easier, and to make the process clearer).
246 See supra notes 58-85 and accompanying text (arguing that the postmarket monitoring of
prescription drugs by FDA is not as forceful as it should be); see also LESLIE PRAY & SALLY
ROBINSON, INST. OF MEDICINE, CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY 58 (2007)
(recommending increased authority so that the FDA can punish drug sponsors who do not cooperate).
247 See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text. Under the current FDA system, the FDA
receives reports from several sources and is also required to approve drugs as well, is too complex to
effectively monitor. Id. In Europe, drug companies each must appoint one person to monitor their drugs
postmarket. See Volume 9A, supra note 173, at 18.
248 See supra notes 132-133 (contending that punishments can serve as an incentive to monitor
properly); see also The European Union Penalties Regulation Explained by Hogan and Hartson
Lawyers, PHARMA MARKETLETrER, July 30, 2007, at 2 (describing the increasing fines that can be
levied against drug manufacturers if they do not cooperate).
249 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 19 (pointing out that the FDA is plagued by vulnerabilities in
its ability to monitor drugs postmarket); see also PRAY & ROBINSON, supra note 246, at 58 (calling for
Congress to increase the strength of the FDA in regard to enforcement of postmarket monitoring).
250 See Steenburg, supra note 2, at 367-68 (explaining that the Vioxx saga coupled with the large
percentage of ongoing and incomplete studies, may have sparked the need for stronger enforcement
tools); see also Further Actions Needed, supra note 246, at 9 (recording the GAO's suggestion that
Congress expand FDA's enforcement power).
251 Steenburg, supra note 2, at 368 ("A bill currently pending in the House would allow fines of up
to $5 million, with each thirty-day period constituting a separate violation."); Furberg et al., supra note
117, at 2 ("The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Accountability Act of 2005 (HR 879),
introduced by Representatives Stark and Berry, would, if passed, send drug industry CEOs and other
executives to jail for a minimum of 20 years if they knowingly conceal serious adverse drug
experiences.").
252 Steenburg, supra note 2, at 368 (commenting that firms are "inclined to drag their feet" when
complying with postmarketing commitments because revocation of approval is rarely exercised, absent
a serious safety problem); see 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(1) (2008) (mandating the terms upon which
withdrawal is appropriate).
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companies will no longer hesitate to fulfill their commitments in order to
avoid liability and fines.2 53 The FDA should have legal authority to require
industry compliance and completion of postmarketing studies through the
use of fines and injunctions.2 54
Other suggestions for enforcing completion of these studies include:
instructing drug applicants to provide additional and meaningful
information on their annual status reports, improving their own
management information system, and ensuring that FDA reviewers are
fulfilling their own responsibilities in overseeing the completion of these
commitments.2 55 Drug applicants should be instructed to include more than
just a description and schedule of their commitments. 256 Submission of
study protocols, completion dates, and final reports can serve as signals that
companies have completed one stage and are progressing towards the
next.257 A more efficient management system would entail organizing their
commitment database by study start dates, original scheduled completion
dates, and final report dates.258 Moreover, a system that identifies late
ASRs and outstanding commitments would alert reviewers of their status
and eliminate the risk of the commitment being overlooked or forgotten. 259
253 See Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox,
82 IND. L.J. 623, 653-54 (2007) (noting the Act sought to ensure enforcement of FDA rules by creating
serious consequences for manufacturing companies that failed to comply); see also Steenburg, supra
note 2, at 368 (quoting Representative Pete Stark, as he described the lack of incentives for firms to
complete their studies).
254 Kelly, supra note 85, at 3 (suggesting the Agency be provided with greater enforcement
authority, and that such reinforcement mechanisms "reflect [a] widespread congressional impatience
with the fact that the majority of postmarketing surveillance studies promised by companies are never
completed"); see Furberg et al., supra note 117, at 3 (explaining that for postmarketing studies, the
FDA needs additional and clearer authority to hold manufacturers to their commitments and to
adherence to a fundamental of sound science that all study results, whether favorable or unfavorable,
must be reported to the FDA in a timely manner, accompanied by disclosure to the public and/or other
follow-up action; failure to meet postmarketing commitments should have clear consequences for the
offenders, which could include fines, probation, public embarrassment, or even drug withdrawal).
255 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 19-21 (proposing the key changes necessary to ensure a more
efficient Agency); see also Gilhooley, supra note 49, at 361-62 (stating the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academy, in recognizing the drawbacks to the current passive postmarketing system has
recommended similar improvements to strengthen FDA authority and promote active surveillance).
256 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, 19-20 (arguing the information provided does not assist in
ensuring progress of postmarketing commitments); see also GAO, supra note 85, at 24 ("Data
constraints-such as weaknesses in data sources and limitations in requiring certain studies and
obtaining data-contribute to FDA's difficulty in making postmarket drug safety decisions.").
257 See HI-IS OIG, supra note 42, at 19-20 (highlighting the importance that the FDA mandate a
greater level of detail in ASRs); see also Kelly, supra note 85 (commenting that tracking the progress of
a company's postmarketing commitment is a significant issue considering that "about two-thirds of the
1231 studies pending as of September 2005 had not even been initiated").
258 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 20 (positing that a more efficient system would ensure the
FDA database is populated with useful information); see also Schanz, supra note 7, at 496 (stating that
the FDA currently lacks a system for managing postmarket study commitments).
259 See HHS DIG, supra note 42, at 20 (suggesting that by enhancing the current reporting
capability, it would enable reviewers to "readily identify approved new drug applications for which
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Timely review of commitment reports and ASRs by FDA reviewers are
essential to this process. 260 Although the FDA has numerous priorities and
a limited staff, postmarketing commitments must be accurately and
promptly monitored. 261
Another key improvement involves the FDA's Adverse Event Reporting
System (AERS). The FDA must shift from passive surveillance of adverse
events to proactive surveillance. 262 One method is to have trained
employees who specifically search for adverse events to add to an existing
adverse events database. 263 Implementing a systematic solicitation of care
providers for adverse event reports, and a systematic screening of those
records will provide for greater coverage of adverse events. 264 A systematic
collection of primary patient records will also yield better results.265
Another proactive method is for Congress to allow the FDA access to large,
private and public administrative databases such as the Department of
Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Defense, as well as other large
health plans. 266 This would allow the FDA to provide important safety
information by linking pharmacy databases with clinical patient
ASRs are due as well as those with open commitments that are behind schedule"); see also Schanz,
supra note 7, at 496-97 (explaining that one-third of annual status reports on postmarketing
commitments are not submitted or are incomplete, and even many completed reports lack useful
information).
260 See HHS OIG, supra note 42, at 21 (positing that in doing so, it will allow the public and
medical community to be aware of the risks, benefits, and optimal uses of approved drugs); see also
Steenburg, supra note 2, at 326-27 (explaining that given the potential adverse effects on American
patients and the absence of absolute certainty as to all the risks associated with a drug at the time of
approval, the timeliness of completing postmarketing commitments may be critical to the public safety).
261 See HHS 01G, supra note 42, at 21 (stating FDA must find a way to provide the information,
tools, and time to its employees to complete the postmarketing studies); see also Basquill, supra note 1,
at 84 ("[F]or all their responsibility, the FDA is woefully understaffed and under-funded.").
262 See Furberg et al., supra note 117, at 4 (advocating that a switch to active surveillance approach
would be more beneficial than the passive approach); see also Gilhooley, supra note 49, at 361-62
(stating that the first step in detecting adverse affects is to implement an active surveillance system).
263 See Bright, supra note 11, at 611 (suggesting an employee could systematically solicit care
providers, screen records for evidence of adverse effects, or download primary patient records); see also
Denise Grady, Medical Journal Calls for New Drug Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at Al
(arguing that the problem with current drug tracking is that it is done by drug makers rather than
independent parties).
264 See Bright, supra note 11, at 611-12 (stating that other writings have found that soliciting the
information has produced more reports than routine reporting systems); see also Gilhooley, supra note
49, at 363 (discussing Congress' goal of covering 100,000,000 patients' records by 2012 through the
active surveillance system).
265 See Bright, supra note 11, at 611-612 (noting findings that show solicitation revealed
significant numbers that were not found through other means). See generally Neckers, supra note 12, at
303 (positing that increased reporting and vigilance will lead to decreases in drug related injuries).
266 See Furberg et al., supra note 117, at 4 (suggesting that Congress provide additional money and
staff for the FDA to utilize these databases); see also Gilhooley, supra note 49, at 370 (stating that the
law requires the FDA to publish postmarket safety information on a website to better inform patients
and care providers of drug risks).
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information. 267 The FDA could also implement a surveillance system based
on large population-based and disease-specific registries from other
countries.268 For example, common conditions that occur internationally,
such as liver or renal failure, or sudden cardiac death, could be the focus of
these disease-specific registries. 269 The FDA's ideal surveillance program
"should be based on epidemiologic principles so that inferences can be
made about the specific, overall, and relative public health burdens of
different types of ADE."270
Other possible reforms are to implement a policy of "conditional
approvals," or to create a system of scheduled reviews, such as those in
Japan. 271 Under conditional approvals, a drug would have a time-limited
approval status, conditioned on their completion of recommended and
requested postmarketing studies.272 For example, a study that leads to
approval might include 500 patients, but 5000 might be needed to judge
safety. "Conditional approval might be based on 500 patients, and the
company might be told that data on 5000 will be required for full
approval." 2 73 If a drug remains "conditionally approved until certain data
are available, providing an incentive to collect those postmarketing data"
can be another alternative. 274 The EMEA is currently attempting to make a
"1-year conditional approval a regulatory option." 275 Adopting Japan's
267 See Furberg et al., supra note 117, at 4 (positing that the FDA should routinely review drug
withdrawals to find connections); see also Gilhooley, supra note 49, at 363 (noting that the FDA is
taking steps to link the information from Medicare and private insurance companies to its own
database).
268 Furberg et al., supra note 117, at 4 (suggesting that the overrepresentation of suspected drugs in
disease-specific databases would point to potential for harmful drug effects); see also Bright, supra note
11, at 611 (discussing registries set up in the United Kingdom to monitor adverse affects of specific
drugs).
269 Furberg et al., supra note 117, at 4 (adding that international disease-specific registries would
nicely complement the FDA's MEDWatch program); see Neckers, supra note 12, at 304 (discussing the
AERS which stores various information on the safety of FDA-approved drugs).
270 Bright, supra note I1, at 605.
271 See Furberg et al., supra note 117, at 4 (suggesting that "[flirst, the FDA should have a
'conditional approval' policy for new drugs"). See generally John R. Manthei et al., Changing the
Landscape for Device Manufacturers: Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, 15
NO. 2 HEALTH LAW. 10, 11 (2002) (describing the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of
2002 which "imposes stronger pre-market and post-market controls on reprocessed medical devices that
are approved or cleared for single-use only").
272 See Furberg et al., supra note 111, at 4 ("A time-limited, conditional approval status would
place pressure on the sponsors to conduct and report recommended safety studies."); see also Kelly,
supra note 85 ("[T]he IOM wants Congress to give the FDA legal authority to require industry
compliance with FDA-initiated changes in labeling and completion of postmarketing studies, to limit
distribution of certain new drugs, to restrict direct to consumer (DTC) advertising for a period after a
new drug is launched, and to maintain 'an active adverse event surveillance system."').
273 See Kelly, supra note 85.
274 Furberg et al., supra note 111, at 4.
275 Id.
DRUG SAFETY
systematic reviews of drugs a certain number of years after approval are
another way of closely monitoring for adverse events. 276 The FDA's
"system consists mainly of pharmaceutical companies' reports of adverse
drug reactions and adverse events." 277 However, a postmarketing system
with more precautionary phases like Japan's system, would create a more
effective and successful system.2 78
CONCLUSION
The FDA has enormous responsibilities concerning the approval and
testing of every drug before it is released onto the market. The FDA
undoubtedly continues to make valuable reforms to its drug approval
process. However, the monitoring of a drug's safety and efficacy after
approval is just as important. As the international leader in the
pharmaceutical market, it is imperative that the United States maintains an
efficient process of regulating drugs post-approval that keeps pace with the
ever-changing pharmaceutical world. The persisting problems with
postmarketing must be dealt with immediately and innovatively - whether
this requires using fines and injunctions as a way of creating incentive, or
emulating other countries that have successfully handled similar problems.
Nevertheless, these problems must be resolved.
276 See supra notes 179-183 and accompanying text (describing the workings of Japan's
monitoring system); see also Yahiro & Nakai, supra note 205 (providing information regarding the
newly revised Japanese pharmaceutical laws).
277 Neckers, supra note 12, at 308.
278 See Neckers, supra note 12, at 308 (noting that in Japan, the postmarketing surveillance system
requires pharmaceutical companies to complete early adverse reaction reports, clinical experience
investigation, special investigations, and postmarketing clinical studies); see also Yahiro & Nakai,
supra note 205 (revealing that the Japanese government "enacted sweeping revisions of the
Pharmaceutical Affairs Law (PAL)" on July 31, 2002, which "reflect the government's efforts to ensure
the quality, safety, and efficacy of medical products").
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